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since world' War II,  the concept of monetary union hss bccn d.lsousead. in
thc literature in two na,ln oonterts. ftre first  onc - thc princj-pa1
writers are Meadc a^nd. scitovsky (t)  - $Ba oonca::ncd rlth thc
qtregtion whether nonetary union facllitatce tbc succcgsful formatlon of
arl econonic union. fhe gecond onc -  wlth l[undc]1,IfcKfuuron and Kcnnen (2)
as protagoniete (z) - deveropecl the crogeLy coruroctec coaocpt of an
optinun currcucy erea a,s an allcgcd.ly norc coastructivc nay of coaductitg
thc old' d'obatc about fixed or flexibLc cxchange ratcao Confirsion bstrccn
these two approachce to noactary r::cion has Lcit to a,n inconcl-usive djsougsion
both in theory and for econmic policy.
thc first  approach starts fron the glven situatlon of a ougto's or ecoaonlc
unionr which nay cnpirioelly be far fbon opti.ual in tcrng of nowncnt of
productlon factors withi.n thc arca; barroniartioa of fiscsl and. othcr policy
inetnrmentel ctc.  Given the cnpirical fr"ancrork, thc glcotion tbcn ir
whcther monetary r:nion'hclps in uaking d.cvclopncnt tomrd.s fir}L rconomic
union urore viablc.
The sccond. approrch, on tbe othcr lnnd., speoificaLLy attcnpts to i6catlf5r
thc economic conclitions of en arc& rtthin rhich it  nay bc optioaL ts havc
fixcd' axchanrge ratcg anct flcriblo cxolrangc ratce rith the rcgt of thc uorld..
fhe fbnda,nental ncalo.css,  a,nd. even oontrad.lctioa, il  the thcory of optinal
qFrency &rcas ie that it  trics to apply optlnality rnles to actual eituations
that are typicel'ly suboptinal ia tcrng of coononic cfficicaoy. Econmic
theory shotts thatr when at least onc sf thc ccononlc opti.nality nrlcs ls
.../...
(t) .r.n.--M9f1"r trthc-baLancc of payncnts problcns of a Europcen llrcc llrad.c
l":"",  Eognornic Jgurnal, Scptcnbet L9.J7i T. Soltovsky, i,lb,o tUpory of the balanoa of paJruuonts enil tbc problcn sf & omnoa uuroiia.n curnenoy;,
(e) n.l, Mundoli, trA thcory of, opti.rnrn ourrcnoy r,rGogr, .{narloa,n Sconmic
Egglgl!,r scptcnbor_r96r;  _R.ro MoKiruron, nopitnrn eurrffioan
Euononlo Rcvicw, Soptcnber 1963; p.B.-Ecn-n, nlho thaori of optirffi
ourroncy  aroag ln R.A. Hundcll rnd. A.K. Snobode, (cds.);
aI Eoonoy, Chlcago t L969. ProbI
an colcctlo vicwn,-2-
violetctl, it  is no longer possible to say e priori. whcthcr thc cnforccmcnt'
of first-bcst rulcB in thc renaining parts of thie cconomy wilL improvc or
impair thc efficianoy of'the systen (l).  In particuler, a nonetary
union, lf  it  is to be dcfincd ae cmplctc currcnc;y unificationr cloes g!
@1xi"nprovctheofficiencyofanecononi'crrnionrtdorcover,wcoanno{;
Bay a priori  that the arca of a nonetary union should. colncidte wlth that r:rf
the eoonomlc l'11ion. Monetaryunificetlon  shouLdL contributc to economio
the tion
inccl
This conocptual inoon.sistoncy of the theorTr of optinun currenoy areag ist  oa
the other hand, avoicled try thre flrst  approaoh to the problen' r,rhere tbe gtrestlon
wae indeed. cast in terns of e,xped.lency (i.e.;  in te:ms of rtsecontl-bestrl
thcory), by asking whetharre;i,ven attonpts to d.errclop a custous union lnto a
ful-L ccononlc union, monetary unification is or is aot an cffioicnt ray of
lnplanenting th.at Prooes$o
Thc sccond-bcet tbcoretioal  approach  suggestcct  abovc lcads to e tlsfinitjlon
of nonetary wrioa rhioh aey sca6 somcnhat eaguo hrt it  is pcrbaps EorQ
rclcna.nt to actual cnpiri,caL appllcetion. Idsnctary unioat fron thie poht oj
and. control of noncy within lb9 unioa. aE a cor@lLary; tbis dlcf,inltlon
irnpliee that, withia thc unionr cxohangp retcg erc fircdr otr if, flcrlblc,
that thcir changes are aincil at uraxlnlzlng effloi,onoJr in the proooBB lcad'lng to
firLL cconornic uniono
Cnrcia1 to thls rnay qf dofining nonctary union is thcn tbc itl'cntlfioationt
a.nit Erantificationr of :
(a) what inefficiancicE nay arinc in thc ugc enrl oontrol of noncyl
(U) fn wbat oascs cxcSangc rate ohengicE arc ncrcl"y nonctary phcnonqnat rnd' in
what caEcs thcy nay thmnclvcE cau6c rcal oflrcotB.
... /...
(f) for thc applloatior of tlris thcorctlocl frrncrorh to tbc opti-mn ourreBoy
aree clcbail, sco ]1. Dc Cccco, rq.ra tcorlr dclLc ircQ EoncterLc ottbc
c 1rurdflcazione Bonotar:La  curopcarrl tfotc EqononLohc ttcl toatc dcl Parohl
d.l Slcnar I9?1.
of of
onl-y be g end. bencfitg of tbcir*3-
2,  4F'FICTEWCT  0r MoSETARY  AlrD F,ICETIIoE RAgEI'oLICIE5
As forcetbLly und.erltned by a group of econonlstg in a reoently published.
docunent (f)r  ttre functions of noney as a untt of account, neans of
payment, and store of value are such thatr rhen a alngle cunency is  adopted
in a number of countrles ancl incleed, in the ].i-nit by the whole wo?ld, najor
advantages accrue from gteater econonio efficiency. 0n thie basis alone, mone-
tary union ghould inply a single ourrency, or, at 1east, conpletely and ime-
vocably fixed. exchange rates alnong currenclee of the member c''rrurtries,  lnd.
menbership should be univereal.  Money, however, is thought to be imporda.rrt not
only for the ilemand. that it  gatlefies as a wtit  of aocount, neans of palnnent ,
and store of value, ht  also beoause its  a.uount relative to other fina.nclal
and. real aesets in the econoqy ls a factor in cleterninlng clecisions to spend.,
and so may influence the proportlons of expenditure d.evoted to lnvestment or
consunption. llhus, controlling the eupply of noney (or the oond.itions of cre-
clit that result in the supply of money) is  consid.ered. as an important aspect
of eoonomic policy.
The question for nonetary union, fron this  second poiat of vicw, beconce
whcther cconmic efflcicncy in the proccss lead.ing to economic union is
naximizcd by unifying nonetary polioy at thc nonotary union l"evclreither
dircctly  on the baeis of a singlc cumcnoy, or iraclircctly through firecl
cxchange rates a^nong thc currcncics of ncnbcr countriee.
Preliminary to this qucstion, however, is the cnrcial qucstion around. which
turns nuch of the tlebate in monetary theory a.nd. policy, na.nely to what extent
nonetary policy ie eapable of influenci:rg the real ecorlonf,r Or tbc other hand.rthe
answers to that question impLy a vier of the effectivenoes of e:ohange rate ohan-
gee, viz rhother tho effeote nay be oonEidcrcd at least to sone extent more tharr
purely nominal.
2"r
0n the effectivenese of nonetary policy cconmists are divid.etl, although
there is a growing conscnsus tbat, in loagrnrn situ.atlons, nonetary. policy is
unable to affect the level of real actlvity,  but only affectg the rete of price
inflation.  Thers is Euch less agrcsmcnt &s to how uuch lnfluenoe monetarjr policy
has on the level of eoononic actlvity  in the short run, and
(t) nuttierrea
nanifesto
,"./,.,
in [he-ES9ngg|li,  Novcnbcr let, IIJ)1 as trfitc AI1 Saintst day
for European monetary  rutionrr.-4-
on thc lergth of thie rrrn.  EceLdcs, not all  cconolets acccpt long-nrn
gituations as cnpirically'relcvant,  since thcy naintain that thc stnroture
of a.n eoorrony, ead as a consegucnco  Gvcn lta pol.iticaL franeworkr nay be
noclifietl by a eerics of short-run effects, and" hence never expericnce the
long-run situations that ars envisagetl in nodclel of balanccd econonic
grorth.  In their view, thc long rrur nust be brought within the scope of
active econonic poLicy by clesigaing interventiong d,lreeted. at changC.ng the
stnrcture of an ecotrotlf,o
0n the other handt al'l economlsts accept that;r in at least one llmited
Bense, monetarlr polioy hasl reerl effeote, viz on i;he ilistribution of income
betreen the money-lesuing authoritiee (tbe govemment) and money-11gsrs  (the
general pubrio), since real rereources (the so-calLt.ed. seigniorage ) are extraot-
ed. by the former from the lat{;er through the iesrrer of a non-interest bearlng
asset (money) whose margir:ral c;ogt of prod.uction  jLer lower than the marginal
value of the real resourcos a4;ainet rhich it  is or:changed. When there is in-
flation,  additlonal real resourceg are obtained ik'om money-uE€rs  in the form
of an inflationary tax rate eqfual to the differenc,e between the nominal rete
of interest and the rgal rate of interest. Moreorler, booauBo moet contracts
involvlng goods, serrrioes, anct financlal aseetsp a,re in nominal tenne, infla'-
tion can aleo have real effect;g on the distributilon of inoome anong indivi-
duals (d.ebtors vs. oreditors), and arnong fi:notlonal or eooial olasses (wage
earnels vs, proflt  earnerg anil'rentiersl workers \rs. capital'iete ; young
people vs. old. peoPle).
2.2 The ef,fectivoness of  rate policy
The above view would. slggeet that the real oosts to any aatlonal' economy of
hanoonlzing nonetary pollolee  fithin  a fixed exchra.nge rste e0rstemt or even of
merging them into & cogthonr po).ioy on the basig o1l a singls ourrenoyl sJte (f)  tUe
ahort-run affects on the Level. of national eooaonio activlty,  ana (Z) the re'-
distributlve effeots aobtavabl.e by ellowing the uationaL inflation  rate to
depart from the avsrage level of lnflatlon  for the union. Considering thc verry
elzsable banefits of a slngle anrn€lrcJr lefertsd to atrover the introduotion  of su'oh
a curronoy rould. appear to cudd,on bala,noe, to lihe welfare of the unlon.
.rr/..u,5-
0n this vler one would' hava to attaoh vcry great reight to the politiaal
relevancs of the short-run effeots of nonetar]r pollcy on the level of real
aotivity and/or of choosing tbe natlonal lnflation rate to aohieve a desired.
inpaot on the redrstribution  of inoone and, vearth.
There ats manJr eoonomiete, partioula,rly among tbose aegooiated. with tbe
formulation of demand'  nanggement polloler, nho would. be prepared. on tbeee
grounds to argue that harmonization  of nonetary policiee nlth fired exchange
ratee wlthin the union, or outrlght adoptloa of a conmon currency, rould. add.
to inefficienoles in an area in rshloh rigiditleg of varloue kinds reeul.t in
monetazT and ored.i.t pollcy havlng tmportant real effectE on the level and
structule of economio aotivity. Thus economiete shartng this vicw would. tend.
to propose nore flcxible rates ri_thin the r:nion in to
sqgfor  thoae rlgidities.  at leaet ag Long ag they nerslst rithin  and anong.
the regiong and co'ntrieg-leronging to the union. but  only sg rolg gs the
real benefits of usinp t te lnetrunent are or to thoee
lhrtbcrr the authorrtiae oftcn berieve that noneta^:iv
policy is a powerful i-uptmnent in influcnoing enplolment levele, and thc
existencs of this bel.lsf, whether cnplricaLly valid or not, would. imp\r that
divergent nonctary policies ca^nnot bc avoid,ed and. would., thcrcforc, rcquire
ohangca in exohange rrtea.
fhusr thc positicne sketched above on thc cfficecy of nonetary policy
entail sme view aetothe cffectiveneee of cha.ngss in exchange rateg.
changes in exchange rates, being chalgcs in thc price of one Doney in tcros
of a'notherr rill  hrve real and nonetary cffects on the sene groun6e on r.hich
it  ie naintainccl  th"at changes in thc stoolc of noney also have rear or sinpry
nonetary effecte.
The clistinction betwcen uonetary aniL reaL effccts of exchange ret6 chang€E
is closely oonructed wrth a Judgencnt as to:lhc r.erwth of tho sbofi nrn.
In ord'er to clrrify and nalce thern enpiricalJ.y relevia.nt, it  nay be uccful to
reetate thegc:onoepte  in another way.
Exciunge ratc olrengcs nay be congi.dcred, to affect prinerily thc barancc
of payncntB /ana[ partlorlarry thc ourrcnt acoornt), or prfuarily thc donestlc
pricc I'evel. To si-nprify nattcrs, the firEt vlcr nslntalns thst cxcbalgc ratc
chart&B harc 1r the nain quantrtf cffccts (on fuportg ancl, crporta, and. banoe on
production  md' expcnditure), rhiLc the acoonil vicw naintains tbet axchangc
rata cbanga nalnly affect money prrcea, and b,ave no lasting sffectg
ll=lowin€ :Lrom a siggle ounenoy_.
aarfrr,,,6-
on real quantitics. We na;p associatc thc flrgt vicr with ths Kcyncsian
tradition, and thc scoond. ''rier with the nonsteriet tradition.
It  is not suzprlsing th.at thc flret vier, the {:@  of
thc cffects of excbange ralbe clhanges on the suryent accountr md on incme
a.nd. enplolmcntr r1as iaitia.Lly rlcveJ'opcd und'cr the ptlrely lbynesialr aasullptiot:rs
of fixect noney reggs a^n<l p:nicegr even tborgh fh'3.L enploXmeat eitu'ations $ere
incorporated into the eo-c&I1e& "@t  by thc developncnt of
thc ,,absor,ption  apDroaoh,t. In aAy ceBcr whatoverbhc assumptions of the
various nod.elg in thie etnrnd of thorght, thc anal;prim nas always concerned
with itlentifftng thc channels 'bhrorgh whlch erobaqge rate changes could'
haye real effcctsl i.o. cffects on gpantitlas  (snrotr as :t'cal incme a'nd' trade
flowe) and on relatlvo prLees (suoh ae thc terue of trade) a'nd' not einply
nonetary or noninal effectso Attention nas thcrcfore pa:LtL to thc rolc of
exchange ratc changeg |n the p:rocees of a.d.justncnt to a baula'nce of payuents
disequilibriurn, or, nore b:noa.d..Ly, io tbc uee of exr:lunge r'rrte changes as
jnstnlnlents of econonic po.Licy tha,t, *ogether with other furstruments
(nonetary and fiecal), cou.Lcl aBsure the naintcla,nos of both interreal (nrff
cnplotrrment) "nd 
exrcrnal (iralarrcc of payncnts) cqu1llibrium.
In ihc altcrnativc vier, rhioh has becn partiorrlarly enph''aslzcd eincs thc
Iat<, sirtice ln the forn of thc t
p;@g4!gr cha.:lgcs in cxcha.ngc  :catesca,rnot be an a[lbonoDoua cauxso of c]unges
in rclative prlccs, and hence of cha4geg in reaL ,quantities.
Both views haver in any Cagor ov€roonc thc pa:rlbial equiLibri'un a'nal;rsis
of the foreign exchange na:rket a^nd the balanoc of palmbnte, and 'look upon
then ae d.epend.ing on thc overa.Ll cquilibriun of t.[e oconolrf,o l[]rutr, both views
consider the problen of cqtr,iLi'lrrlun in thc balancc of payments as dctemiaed'
by thc relationsbip  betrecu inooms and expenditurs (tUc currcnt a'c'count
egtrilibrirrn) a^nd by the dcsirc to bolcl ccitain proporttons of forcilgr aagetg
in thc overall finanoial portfoJ.io of thc ccoaorur tithc capitaL account),
with enphasls by tho noaetarisibg sn thc relatlon between supply enil, d'ana'ntl
for noney es the ultinate rlctel:ninant of thc owrell bala,noc of patrm$nts
Bccornt. Thc eegcntiaL cllffcronoG thcn d.oce not L:Le ln thcsc statcnantst but
rathcr on acccpting or not the vier that ctu,ngts in exclrangc ratce carr aff,cct;
thcsc rclatlonships !n & pcrqerrcnt nay, |tr  o&ll 'havc real cffects on thc
ratio of c4pcncliturc to lnoome' on portfolto al!'ooationr arl& on tbc clou'udl
for rcal caeh balanceg"
..o/rr..-7 -
2.2.L
since the d.cvcropnent of thc theory of purchasing  power parlty,
it  has been und.erstood. that exchange rate cira^nges have, at leaet as a
tendeno.v, the effect of aligntng the price 1evel of trad.eable  good.s
on the world. level (when tranelated. in terns of a common unit of
accor:nt). Ttris, in itself,  is d.ue to thc arbitrage of goocls in integra_
ted' narkete, and doee not cha.nge the relative prices of d.ifferent good.s
a'nd services.  When only two aggregate sectors are coneidered., naruely
that pr6duclng e4portable good.s and that facing the conpetition of
inportsr exchange rate cha^nges cerurot affect, i:r this view, the egui_
llbriurn level of the te:Ds of trad.e. rf,  for e:rerapIe, ths donestic
currency is d.e\Elued, thereby inoreaeing the price of imports in
d.onestic surrency, this  change is  cmpengated.  by an cquiproportionar
increasa ln the price of exports in terss of doneetic curr€lc]r
rf  these were the only coneequences of cha'ges iJr cxchange rates,
the terns of trad.e would. not cha^nge, and. it  wsulal therafore not be
very lnteresting to analyee the effecte of exchange rate shang€e on
the current account of the bala^nce of paSnnents. Putting it  another
r,ayr stnce a d"evah:ation warLtl not have expencliture-sritching  cffccts
(because the relative price of i"nports ancl erporta bacl not otrang€d,),
it  could have an effect on the qr:.rcnt acoount onLy if  it  bad.
e:rpend'iture-reduclng  effeets (trrrorgu the attcupt of the aonlgovernncnt
sector to reoonstitute the real valuo of their  cash baranocs).
since, at this level of pnalysis, thc terms of tra.d.e d.o not charrge
with changee in the exchanrge rate, the d.istinction betwcen inportable
a.nd. exportable goods (or seotors) is not very iateresting.  rt  is nore
illuminating to agStregate  importableg and" exportableg into the trad.eabla
(or exposed.) good.e sector, and. d.isti:rguish  instead. a non-tred.eabre
(or sheLtered') good's soctor.  A change ln the excirange rate woul6 then
crearry affeet, at reast initial.ly,  tho rel.ative pri.ca of trad.eablee/
non-tradeablee, since it  equally ilcreases (with a d.eyaluation) botb
i-nport a"nd cxport prices when thcy are ncaslred. in terus of d.oncstio
ourrencyo Thue, excha.nge rata chan6es sesn to have a rerative pricc
effect, although not the trad.itional one on the terrns of trade.  Even
thisr  b,owever, is only ternporary" In fact, rrnless a ohange in the exehange
... /. r.-8-
rate nae to af,fcct thc rciaL produotlvc oepaoit:tcs of tbc coononyr or tbc testcE
of the oountry as regarde the aI[ ocation of lts cxpenclrture betrccn trad.eables
and,noa-tracleablcar  the raoononX nuet ncoeeaa::lLy cmc baoklntlubeorrscto
the inlttal  reaL posltionr with the tnltia,l relative prlces and the saue
oument acootutt.
Drc process of adJustnent, h  the nonetarist vier, goes throrgh tlrc
defLationary effect on e:qrend.j.ture that is provoked. by the inorease  i$.
thc prioes of tradeable good.s (acpend.iture-:reduclng effect).  This
induoeg a tenporary surplus in the cunent eocount, which, in the abseace
of offeetting capital novements,  and of stcniLizing nonetary poLicy,
punps noney into thrr ec,on&Xr thus reconsti*uting  real bala"nces a,!d.
hence e4pendliture at th,e initial  ].eve1 and,, aLso, in the process, raieing
the prioe Level of non-'trad.eable  good.s so aH to bring theo back into
line with the highe:r pr;ice level of tnadcablle goods.
In g!gg!S,  acco:rding to tbe nonetgrist view, the relative prioe
effects of exchange 
"a+,8 
c'na:c.ges ars onJ.y'te,npor&rf,r li[oreoner, they d"o
not invol-ve the le,rns o:f trade, but ratherthe relative price between
tradcables aDd non-ilrad.eables.  ldore irportant, they trigger off e:rpend.-
iture-reC.aoing (or experd.iture-erpandLtng)  of,feots that are aLso onLy
ternpo:'aryr until the re&I valuc of essete Brc rcoonstitutact, together
r:th the real (relal;ive,) prices and real qrrantlties of proctuction anct
clenand.l after this, the balance of, pagrnents will be agaln at ite i.nltiraL
1eveI.
It  nay be interesting, and. cnr.cial for certain purposes, jg-@,
the lersth of tilne llor 1;hese effects to talcer pJ.ace. Eowever, it  is clsar
that, iir tiris view, the real nariabLes of tbtre eoonony will not be
affected in the lon4; nrn by exohange rate oha,ngese
Sioilar consid.eratioas  to thoee tLeveloped. above are used to naiata:Ln
tbat the effects of excl nrge rate ctra.ngee &ro onLy nonetary in the long
run even when capitaL uovements are expLicli.teLy introducecl into the
picturel 1.e. whea the c;apital aooornt ls conslderecl in ad.clltion to tho
cturent account of the traLance of pa5mentsn fiorever, ira' the short nur,,
thege capitaL fLows can bc responsiblc for the erratic flluctuation of {;he
cxchange rate around, Jcher purohaeing powor pa,rity.
o.. / r..-9-
Ae an e:cpS.anatioa of the a,bove phcnmenonrlt cou,ld. be argued. that
there ls e lack of specrrlation whioh, accorri.ing to the traditional
theory of flexlbLe exchange rates, ought to stebilize the exchanrge rate
around' ite eqtrilib:riun Level, which is detemined  by the purchaalrlg power parity.
fhls clearth of spectlation  coulcl be c!.ue to  the increase in risks faoing
the banke whichr for a long ti.rne, were regard.ed. ae the rrnatural"il
cand.idates for stabiiizing speculative activity, and. to the regulation
of these operations by the central tanlce" (1),
Eoweverr a more general explanation could. be given rhicb tekcs into
account not only  the nonetary nature of the sashrngs rate (i:n te:ms
of purcha.sin$  power parity), but also its dctc:nination in the cbort and
long nur. Accordi:rg to the uonetary approach @  is aot
analytically cletermiaod. by the foreign erohangp urarket or in othcr nords
by the transaction flows recorded on tbe oapital and cument aooount. It
ls d.ejerning9..!v,,tg!  equ.llibriutr anLd disecnriltbriun on the variouagggx
FarkalE (whioh are markets for stooks of monoy relativs to other sGoirIE of
finanolal assets, and are therefore lnterdependent from tha point of vicn of
optiarun portfolio nanag€menr/. In a fixecl exchange m,tc regime, the
variablc to tletemine is the bala,nce of payments; a balanca of palnentef
d.iscguilibriurn is onLy possible in as mch as thare is d.tscgu.ilibrir:rn
in the narket for moncy (ttre tatter could. be dua to nonetary or real
factors). A cleficit or surplue will peraist uatil the narkct for noney
is in eqrrilibrir:rn.  Under a flexible exohangt rate systcm,, the variable
... /...
(f)  Sone attention has bcen dLevoteil rccently to tbe effects that e=cessive
flaotus,tions ia exolmage rates nay have bsd in geaerating falge traciixgr i.c.
ln lnducing crports and. inports (rftl  unclerlylng all.ocatloiJffects  on d.ernand.
and. production)  that arc not rcaIly justified. in telme of conparative ad.nantago. It  should. be noted. tbatr i-n so far as this argunent ls cmprrically correct,
it  d.oee not depend. on exchange rate flexibiLity but on exeessi.ve f}rctuations
antl possibLe exchange rate instabilltye In tbe f.ight of the abovc argunent,
thc latter rnight be the consequence of u"rong poLicies vie-A-vis speculatlon
on the part of nonetary authorities,  a.nd. of not ad.eqtetely trnanaged.n
floatlng ratesr which prevente the d.cveLopneat of more efftclent ercba:rgu
rate narkots. It  shorrld. aLso be und.erlined tbat the enplrical obee:sration
of wid.e exchango rate fluctu^ationg on rhich these reaeorings are baeecl
relates generally to the d.ollar cxcha,nge rate vis-aFvis intl.iviclua,l surrenoi.cgc
Effective exohange ratee have generall"y  becn nore stable. l{oreover,  even
biLateral exchanrgo rates between palrs of European Comunltiesr cunenciea
have generally been nore gtable tha^u rith  respcct to the LI.S. doIIar"-10-
to deternins beconcs the exohange reteS accord.i.ng to thc sanc principl.es
of the nonetarTr  approachl the excba.nge rate riLL contirme to vary, until
thers is equilibriu:o on the narket for noney.
In partio'ular, the exchangc rate is d.etenninect ln ths short nrn
by e:cpectationg concerning the firture return
on d.ifferent kind.s of aseetel lnclucled. here are foreign fina^nclal assets
on r*hich a consideriable part cf thc e"ntioipated. rotu::r '  a function of r:be
e4pected. exchange ritrter Even norer if  exper:tatlons witii respect to ii:re
exchange rate are b:rsed. on prevloue changes in the exchanrge rate, therr
lt  coulcl ditrerge over a long period, of ti-ne f]on its  3.ong-term  nalue.
Before conclud.itrg this sectionr a poasitrl-c rnisunderstanding  shouLd
be cleared. away. The v:Lew that exchangB nalre changes have, by thenseL.ves,
only monetary effeclbsr tloes not neaa that 'lihey cannot accmpangr real
chan€€s. For exa,npiler phen the terme of tEade Eust clmnge for s@e regl
reason thet hpe tli.gFurbr:ll,the inif,ial emri.li-briura. ancl thig cannot be
d.one by the recru.irecl. upwanl and. d.omrratd, JlhanFes ir  Boney prices of t.lg
d.if,ferent oonnod.itieF lrvolved.. a. c,hrangc in the eenei'al pf:Leq level anrj.
consemrentl.y in the exchalr€e rate ig neccsgarlr to achLeve the refirlred ad-
Jgg!gg[. Thus the dlifferrential iupact of l;be oil pricc inoreaee on tber terrna
of trade of individual iLndustriaLized. courribriee has regnired. adclitiona.L
adjustnents of exclrange ratea between eone crf them.
Thc onl.y sense i.n whiohr in this caBo, we nay tal.k of a nreeln cffilct
of exchange rate changeel is that thcse ch"ei.nges avoid. the persistencc of
a real cllsegrrilibriurn ei.tuation. But they a,re only the nonetary fo:nn
that thc real. aclJustneat;  takes, and. orrly one of the poeeible for:nso Both
the cLiseqtrilibrium a,nd. the aclJustnent irrvol-v'e real nari.ables,  a.nd.
nonctary rrariables (t:*e' the exchange rate) accompenJr this ad.justment;
they are not the cau.se of the real chan6e, but the effectr
2.2.2 Real effects of exclunge rate clranges
In appreciating the poeeible rcal" effec*s of exchange rate cbanges,
the Laet pera4raph of the preoed.{ng sectiotr 19 irnpor*ant" IR fact, if  wa
d.o not consld.er tha,t rcal digequlllbrlurn situatione are self-liqutd.atfu€
but night be chronicr then changes ln exolrange ratee aoqrire a etatus rls
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thc driving foroe thrsu€b rhlch rsal effeats can bc obtelneil. fhie
vicw of exobange rate ctrangos ancl thelr reaL cff,ectiveness  ras ind.eed.,
as alrcac\r reoalled', the nain ergunent that earLy Keyaeslans prt fonrar.d.
ia favour of flexlbl.e exchange ratcg or rtanaruatLone eg uea,ns of
fuproving enplo;ment.
Apart flm perslsteat ctisegullibrXun eituations, wc nay now grrestion
tuhethcrr even in situationln rhioh eoononlee tend. to find. their real
eqtrillbriun, exch+ng! rate cbangus cen bave real effectse
the analysie of thc preccdiag sectlon, arthorgh partiorlarly
addressed to the uonetarist vler a,nd. lte iupLications, shorLd. aSeacl;r
havp oast eone f-ight on thie guertionr In fact, ewn in tbat arralysie,
is rccoeoizcd that erchanee rate obalrgcs do haig effects on real
vari^abrcs (relative prioes; quantities produced. and. danand.cd., real
cxpencliture, real incone)r bnrt thet these arc oa].y ternporarTro lfhrue, the
first  guestion ie: rhat is the 1erUth of the period. rluring wbich €xcbargs
rates have soma real effeots (hor short ls the short nu) f  We nigbt also
reisc the eeoond.,question  c is it  ecoeptabrc to consid.en the
llbe Length of the rshortn run rturi'rg wbich ercha,rgs rate cbanges
clo have :rea1 effeots ie conneoted with the existence of narisue rigid.itles
qnd wlth non€y illusisn.  It  shorrld. be olear thet the tern ?rillusionn
does not necesearily  irnFLy an irrational behavior on the part of econmic
agentsr but the fact that for narioae {"lgtitutionaL a,nd. social reasons
econmic contracts are fired. in noney terns and. arc not read.ily acl.justed.
when their real vaLue ohanges with a ohange in the general prlce level.
When the change in the price level is clue to a change il  erchange rates,
we nay taLk of exolu,nge rate i11usion.
llhe theory of opti-urrn clmrenoy areaa adil.ecl. a rrer d.incnsion to the
olassic clebate on flxed vgo flIexible excbange rates, by poircting out that
the
oocnnose ofthc cconoqy. [he nore op6n En eoonqly, ln the EenBe that the
Largar ls the reight (atreot anct lnd,fureot) of trad,ed. good.s prices in the
general prioe levelr the Lesg oredtibl.e it  Lg that noney contracte (and.
short nm ?
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money G)cpead.ituro  on{Ia€cnentB, Iikc  goverrnncnt  cxpend.iture)  aro not
adjusted. for charrges in the crcha.nge rate and the concomita,nt ctra.ngee j'n the
pricce of trad.ed. goo<[e. Thue an elenenl; in reducing the noney illugion
is the exietence of jlnstitutional prorrlsions for ind.exing  noney contractet
and particularl.y wagos a.nd. salerlee. Tlre closcr the indexing refleots
the actual rise :Ln tlre cost of living,  jLreclueive of the increase in
trad.ed. goode prioes, the lower is the d.egree of exchange rate illusi.ont
and the shortcr :Ls tlre nrn during whioh excbange rate changes may ller,ve
real effects.  Iib was indeed with partiou.lar" reference to this noneJ'
illusion argumen'ib, as deternined by the opewregs of ar. econonyr that
l{und.ell and McKinnon indicated a lower ltimit to the smallness of an
opti.urun qurrency areito
Another poinlb ie that the frequent uere of monetary eti'muli followed
by exohange rate dep:ceoration  and domesili.c inflation makes the ghort; run
alrays shorter, sinco money illueion ls rreal<ened, thue rendering therse
monetary ingtrumrsnts  more and more inaflfelctive'
2.2.2.L.  Money illusion  iei also crucial in thre tJrye of analysis that
characterizos reeent stru-cturalist nod.el€, (1).  In these mod'els the
econony is d.ivided iyr two eectors r the exposed (to foreig3r conpetition)
sector, and. the elhel{;ered sector.  The dLi'vision echoes the sinilar  (a"ntl
eqtrally essential. to thclr  a^nalysie) par:tition by thc nonetarists between
the trad.ed a.nd. non-tt:aded good's gcotore., Oiven the excha'nge ratet and
the levcl of foreign prices, the prices of the good'e produced by the
cxpoeed scctor a:re dotcrmfaed,. For a gtvcn wage ratc in thie ecctor and
a gtven labour p:lodur:tivity, thc p"ofit  late is aLso dcterninsdr Since
there is a homoge:neouB Labour narket in 'bhrc countryt the wage ratc and
the rnornalr pro:tit :nate in the sbeltored. sector also deter:nine the level
of prioes in the she.Ltered. sector, for a g1ven productivity of labour
thsre.  If  the p3odurctivity of labour g:F€ltts lees in thc shcltercd  th'an
in the cxposed eocto:n, thc inflation reter will  be higher tiran in the
exposed sector. Thusr in ode overal
.../...
(t) t*  *et  knowr noclcl of t,his ttrpc is the s1;gallecl $cantlinavian uodcl (sec,
8Dongothcts'o.uagre.n1Ko0.!'.r"n,c.E.0d'bner'@
E:lngEXr Allen A Uniitt, I,ond.on 1973). A ei.milar rnod'ef has been usod' b;r
-Cffi'Italian  ocononiste (seo, 
- for exa,np.l.e, l{. dtAnto'iior trSviluppo
dlsegual.c edl infi.azione nclirecononia rtarrana, L9r9-L959rtr U?plta 6: $+4i!1t
s;;i;;b"" I9?il:-tilri" ilr" Soandina.vian  authors havo mainlv analvsed e' pattern
of traile rmion behaviqur thet woutcl kecp :trncons dietributlon oonEtanlu in
thc e:cposEd eootor in tbe roni nttt, ttre itatian contributions havc enphasizcd'
the oonecqucnoca of trad.c uni6n bahaviourbhat rrnsettlee the rrnormalrr lncomo
digtrtbutlon; 
-nnu,, 
th,e analyEie of, oxahango rate ohangee and Eoncy iiLlusion
is alevclopea'cxpftoltely onLy tn thc ltalinn oontrlbutlonsl  whcre tbe;r are
EOCn A8 n6ans of r:cstoring a rrnonnelrr di.atrlbutlon of lnoonel rhca thig is
betng eltcrcil by c*oausive wagc lnorcaecrr-13_
thc country wiLl be hieher. the lareer the gbeltercd sector a,nd. the
lorer tbe rate of growth of productivity in thls  sector relative to  that
ol the exposed. sector.
In the Scand.inavian verslon, a diffbrential  rate of inflation  in a
country relative to the regt of the worLd ie d.eterninect by inad,equate
productivlty growth in the shelterecL eecl;ot. In the ltalian  version, if
wage lnereaseo in the export seotor exceode the sun of the rate of increase
of world markot prloes and the rate of growth of the seotorts labour pro-
ductivity, the easiest way to avoid a fall  in profit  rates is to leb the
exchange rate depresiete.
In this  framework nonetary policy ada,pts to the need for keeping
d.enand. at the full  enplolmrent Ielel,  a^ncl thus for validating inflation
that nay exceed. the international ratcr  In ad.ctition, if  the origin of
the  excessive inflation  ie either excessive r,rage increases or ir:adequate
productivity  growth in the exposed eector, ad.apt;ive rnonetary growth nuet
be eccompa"nied. by 'd.evaluations  ire order to cope wlth the erternal
constraint.
These ideae have been further: developed. by scrmo Italian  economists in
thsir  lnterpretation of the poLloies folLowed by 'th,o Bank of Italy  in
reoent years (1'). fn thelr viewl moneta,rTr and erchange rats pollcies
appear to play less the allegect role  of keeping the eoonony at a reason-
able }evel of enplo;ment a,ncl. low price inflation,  t.ha"n that of sustaining
economic grow-th by allowing profi.t rates at a ttnorrrerlr't level in the face of
excessive  noney nage incroases rerlative to productivit;y growth. When
wage incro&ses endanger the lovel. of profite required. for sustained invest-
ment arrd overall econonic grorth, nonetary policy cotDetr in to alIow, through
price inf,lation, the mark-up requ.i.recl to sraintain no::na.] profits.  Since
thist  on the other hand., makes tlre, country feel the pilt:h of foreign
conpetitionr the ertennal conetrirint on prices is avoid.etl through aband.on-
nent of the fixed exclunge rate I colicy.
The ltalia.n authors recogniztr the linrits of ueing exq:barrge rete and
nonetarv polioies as subJstitutee for_inconeg polictn  Inct:zporation of
tlmntrardl fl"oating in the expocta'bione of wage negotiators rray induoe an
,./...
(t) Sce, in particular, A. Grazieni  a,rrd. F'. tteloni, ttfnflaaionc e fl'.uttuazione
deLla f.iran, l{ote Economiche clel lfonttr d.ei Paschi rli  Sienap 19?,3._L4_
iaflationery spiral that wlII in the cncl dLestroy the nechanim that
the policy is trying to controL. llhc nonetary and fisoal authorities
are then ompel.lccl to f'aLL back on traditi.onal d.eflationary policies.
tloreover, even before thig happene antl whi.Ie tbe d.isguised incones
poi-icy is still  at work,, tbe hnowleclge theut anJr noney wage increase can
be recuperated  through price j:rcreaseg  andL offset in foreign narkets
through exchange cLepreciation, wlll  reducer the incentive to resist wage
increases on the part o'f emplo;fers a,nd gerrerally weaken their search
for efficiency  and tecbnological irnprovenernte in ord.er to renain tnrl;y
conpetitive in foreign marketsr thus 4Eg!'iveLv affecting th  l=g!
structure of the courtr.v an4 its srowth pc$9lligl"
It  is clear frorn th,e above that for a,n excha^nge rate policy to ha've
effects on incons d.lstribution, and througgh them on investnent and gr,cvf[t
it  is essential that noney illusion and. o't;her rigid.itiee be present
cluring a eignificant  pe:riod. of tine (1).  hgain, in this model as
in the theory of optimun currency areaer J'he Ie@
inversel-y related. t,o the d.egfee of openness of the economy. Wha,t is
.../...
(f ) fn this nltaLlann rcaeoni:ng lt  Is aleo arguedl that
(a) tire Lcvcl of investne,nt  depend.s directl;r on profitsr both because these
oonetitute the in,centive to investr and because corporete inveetmen'l;
is LargeLy finanocd t;hrough retained' ea:rnin6a;
(t) ttre exposed sector, bnil particularly  ther gectot producing exportab}t:
goods, is consid.ered. the leaiting sector f'or the growth of the whole
OcOlrotl}o
It  shoulcl be cLear tbpt the itistribution anil growth theory behind. the ltalia.n
vereion of tho etl:ucturaList nod.el is not narginaliet antl neoclassicalr but
of the Kalclor anct Kalec]<i t;rpe. ]loreovenl lndustrial prices ate supposed
to be eot on the baEi.e oli costg (eseentiatly labour ouets) with a mark-r'rp
for nor.mal profits. They are largely indepencient  from the relationship
between d.emand and. supp\r. 0n the other hanrlr the possibility of transf,er-
ring on prices any irrtreaee i'n costs requirran (as in the scandinavian
model) the aeeunptiorr of an adaptlve  moneta:n;r policy.-15-
perbaps nost irtsrestlns ln thc ltallan nodcL is that the real cffects
obteined. cturing the short-nurr/noney  illueion pcriod. invotve not simply
the aLlocation of d.enaacl. ancl production between tracleables a:rrd. non-
tracleables (ttt<e in tbe raonetarist nocteS.), but aLeo the choice to invest
or notr ancl thus rnay affect the etnrcture of the econody ancl its long-
nrn perfotltajnoeo In other rords, in this view, the short-nrn effects
ar'e not reversible,  and. the longrnur etea{y state situation (in which
excha.ngp rate ohangee should have no real effects accorcling to the
nonetarists)  nay incleecL be affecteet by what has happcnecl i-n the short nrn.
z.z.z,z.  A recent strand. of thought (the rscr cBurbriilsq-isghqoll)
naintains that excha^nge rates ehoulal be ueed to keep frrll-enploynent
clenand (export-led growth); nbil-e the problem of eguilibrating the current
erterrral account mrst be solved rith a conespond.ing policy of eguilibriun
ln the governnent sectortg account (Uagetary poj.icy). This second.
prescription rdll  be analysed. latcr, but rit ls intercsting to notc at this
point that the vlew of cha.nge6 in crohangc rates as being eescntial to main-
tain frrLl enplo;ment level of d.enand. aad,/or e4port-led. growth is very
si-util-ar to the viow of excha^nge rates irn the Sca,nd.iu^evian-Itilian
etnrcturaliet nodeLs. On the otber hand., the lVers Carnbridge School d.oes
not geen to fear that this roLe of cxcbange rate cba.ngos - which in ord.er
to rork nust gtill  be based. oa noney illusion - nay be mrllified. in the
long nrn by the incorporatlon of cxcha,ngc rate clunges into prico expect-
ations" Iet, a carefirl ernpirical stucLy of  the UnitetL Kilgd.on (f)  nas
shonn that ttthe output effoot of the exctra^nge rate cha,nge is effectively
transltory,since the conpetitive  ad.nentagc is subseqncntly  wiped. out by
the adjustnent of incme" 1s inFort prioee restoring d.oneetio coste to
prcvious Levelgtr.
2,2,2,3.  Thus elL the echoole of thousht eurveyed  above agte6 that in
lone-nrn sltuatioas noney lllusioa disappears alod. erchange rate
changes therefore are not a,n lnstnrnent of econonic polioy with
real effects on tbe eoonoqy, lllhe essontial d.ifference a,nong thern
,  oll thls igsue ie that while the uronetarists believe that the short
nrn is very shortr tho other aahoole d,o not share this vlew. In-  :
cleecl the etnrotura]"lets feel that the lons-nrn sltuatlon is a
,../.,.
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(f)  See R.J. BalL, T. Btrrnsl J.S.E. Laurtrrt nlte roLc of erchange rate ohanges
in baLa,nce of papnents adJustnent - l[he United. Klngd.on c&sen, tondon
0rad.uate SohooL of Bueineee Stud.leel D.P. 32r July L975.-16-
fiction, whilc all thal; cxists is a scries of ghort-nrn situetious wh:ich
have 5nportant peroanerrt conocqucnces  for thc atnrcture and groith of an
econonv.
In so far as exchange ratc ah+nges aro cormcoted.l clther as a
consequence or es a cartsc, with nonoy infX.atioar they also have reaL
d.istrlbutional effects other than those eraphastzetl in the noney illus:ion
and. stmcturalist argunents analyzed. abovrro In fact, non-interest bearing
noney hag d,istribut;ionell- effects between ilhe noney-issuing authoritiee
a,nd. noney holders even when inflation in perfcotly anticipated. - and
lndeed tbere is a seign:lorage  even when lt  i.s n11. l[!hus, in as far as
chanees ln exchanAe ra'tee al-lott nore fbeed.on to Eovernments in choosing
the preferred rate of i-aflation. they aleo allow then to collect the
lroEarned. r"ata--rtf {nfLation tar.  Moreoverr bcsldles havine a Derniesive
or passive role ln thler prooessr exclunge rate ctnnges have recently been
asoribecl. a,n active foroe in the inflationnry process, a^ncl. tbcrefore in
its digtrlbutional con$equenc6s.  fhe reauonlng is, again, connected with
noney illusion and. wager (d,orrnwarrl) rigidilii,ee. In the internati onal
contert, the inflatriorurry effect of clevalus,tions on the price ]e*re1 o{
ttevaluing countrj.es shouLd be eynmetricaL,Ly sffset by the d.eflationar;y
effect of revaLuati.one on the price lcvel of reraluing aoruttrics, tbus
naking,on thie aooquntrfor a zcro effeot orll the world ratc of lnflLatlon.
Eorever, it  is uaintainecll this s$o!$trT doee not holcl Lr. the real rorld,.
Beoeuge of dormnaro rsase and price riclaliticg. Drloeg rise i-n ihe
d.erraluin* oountries.but;  do not fall  in tbe rerpluing corurtriesr t'lhen
this proceEs takee plaoe ln the contcrt oll a;a abea{y cxisting worLdl price
infletion, a retchet elifect requireo that thE increage of wages and priees
iE not gl.owed doun ln the rerral.uing oorntry by foreign oonpetition.  As a
conscquenoc. world, Dricre inflation is reinforoad by tbc adoption of
flcxible oxolurn*c ratser.
Apart fron noncy i!.Iuslon, seLgnlola€qrcadl thc tnflatlonary tat (wbloh arc
aLL ilietributlonaL cffecte of noney, and. heuoc of crchp.ga rate changeE)r
exclrange ratc obangcs lnsy hevc rsal cff,eotc bcoausq ln narikets that arc
not perf,eot and, ln rhloh infomatton 1g aot oopletc and, ocrtain,
ohanges ln an rooaonio vEriable havc rcal ooatB a,rrd. thur urooontrollod,
crolungr ratc olungas lraw ncgatlvc cffcotar
,.r/.n,_L7 _
1.  EXGEAI{GE RATE CHAI{OES IilD OfiIER POLICIES FOR gFTERtrAt MUITI3RIIM
1.1 Recent analysis uncter the headlna of budeetary polioy (l)
The clifferent strand.s of tbought surveyed. above agtree that, unlese cer-
taln rigitlltlee  and noney illueioa zurvtve in the long nur, exclra,nge rate oba.nges
cannot pernanently affect the strrrcture of the balance of payaents, but only
help in bring:ing it  back to the position that is cleternined.  by reaL forces
(inclucllng portfolio consid.erations)  a^nd. their  change. 8hus, the cument account
is d"eternined.  by the relationehip betreea expend.iture a^nd. incone''xhich, in its
tuln,  clepencls on the working of the overall nacro-eoononic  systen -  while the
proportion ln which a cument acoount cLeficit (eurpLus) wtll  be financed"
(utilized.) by capital novemente or reserve flows will  ctepencl on portfolio con-
eicl.erations of the public and on the aseets issued, by the.gpvertncat  (e).
In thig general vier,  the problen of balance of pa;mente cllseguilibria ancl
thelr adjuetnent  hae a linltecl bearing on the diecuesion about the exchango
ratee regime that ehouldL be adoptecL by a nonetary union. Thie cloes not neaxr
that the adjustment problem is no longer a problen of interest in the d.iscussion
about nonetary union, but only that lt  shouLd. be d.iecussed llore wlth reference
to policies other tha^n exohange rate  policy, and particularly, as we ehall
see, with reference to governnent budgetary policf, and to the policy of fina"n-
clng the governrrent defioit.  In tbls view nthe crohange rate cannot bo re-
gadeA, as it  has been in the past, as an instrunen! of econonic polloy. On the
contra.ry, it  should be seen as'a gpp@  of the behavlour of fiscal  a.nd none-
tary policy. (...)  Floating the rate provicl.ee an ertra d.egree of freed.on to
pnrsue a rate of inflation  in the long run clifferent from that of (other coun-
tries).  But floating the rate would d.o nothing to avold thc necessity of ad-
justing fiscal  and nonetary policy prinarily  torard the balance of paSmente
rather tha"n the leve1 of enploynentn  (3).
3.1.I.  In orrcler to underetand. this position better, refclence nuet be nade to
thc W  neatloned. a,bove. Acoordlng to thie School (4)t
the current account is eesentially deterrnlned.  by the government  bud.get.
.../ ...
A lnore d.etailecl analysis is given 1n Annex B.
Goverrrment here refere to the public geotor.
8a11, R.J., Br:rns, T., Laury, J.$.8., lbidcm.
See LoncLon Ca^mbridge  Economic Bulletin. Bulletlns
the Lonclon  ancl. Cambrid,ge Econonio Servioe r Dept .
Sidgewick Avenue, Cambrid.ge.
82, 83, 84. Prrblishect by
of Appliecl Eoonontcst-r.8-
Ttreir reasoning !s baged.,cn t'wo el'enents. Flrgtlthe er-post acoounting
id.entlty or e;-ante eguilibri'un oond'ltlon 1 rheroby (ooneidering
three aggfegate ssctorg irn the econorys privater r$overnmentl foreign)
an elcc6ss of one sectorfs'sardnggover  investncnt (which is equal to a
finanoial a3d/or nonetary gurplus) nlst be eqqal '1bo tbe excess d'ema3d'
for comnoilities, i.e. the net financial and./or nronetary cteflcit of the
other two seotors together. From the assets poin;t of viewr the excess
dema^nd. for financial assets by one sector rust tre accomrnod.ate 1 by an excess
supply of financial assets by the other two gectors. llbe second element in
their reasonlng is that t,he private seotor hag a; rather stable financing
eurplusl t.€. a net femand for a.dttitional finanoial wealth ln the forn of
aseets issued. by the government and./oc the forei.gn sector" Thus ctisegulli-
bria in the baLanoe of payments on the ounent erccount rost corresponcl (anc[
be deternined. by) ttiseguilibria in the governnent  buitget. In particularr a
clefioit in the cunent account (i.".  a surplus of the foreiga sector) would'
be d.eterurined  by an exoessive deficit in the Sorrenrnent  bud'get. The prescrip-
tion for improving the current account (:.f tfre d[eficit is not an eqtrilibrium
ctefioit) would then be to red.uce the governnent ileficit by a sufficlently
restrictlve br:d'getarY PolicY.
3.I.2.  At a nore eophisticated. 1.eveL, the theory oll intenrational  adjustment
an6 eqqilibria ln open econonleg has progressed. substantially since the €aril'y
sixtles, when the rrp6llc]'-ni:cn ttrrye of analyels was developecl and' nade popu.lar
by the wrltings of t{1nc[el].. lL f"fne of thougtrt that nay be labeLled' the "g!-
folio  aDDroachrl is nalnl;' represeated by eoononists of the neo-KeJmeeia^n
trad.ition (f) ann starte fron a oritique of the olnpl.e KaJmeslan nodels thaif
was initially  advanced. by' rrlrurctel.l himself. It  pol,nta out that thcy are 6saon-
tialLy short-run nodels, in rrhich stooks of asgrlt;e are trnplicitly  hcld'
stant even though flows of *rving and. investnen'b are e:rpllcitly  causing
to change.
Startings Like tbe New Cambridge SchooS"t :fi:on the ex-post lclentitY:
(i) (s-r)-r(o-t)-(x-M).0
con-.
them
iiTfi'-#ffin, n.I.lrund. oategr l{.:E!.rfrllhe Inpltoatlons of Intcnratlonel  Eoononlo
Intcgrettoo rol Moactaryi Fiso&I and. &robange  Batc Policyu I -
priaoeton stuiles-rn rniirn€u!!9f?l= rPa$oL-No '16 I Maroh L966'
Sra.rrson, I{.,n  th Fortfollo Bal.arroc ln opcn
n"*"iii",l i"iiirrted ae senturar Pepcr 22, xnstttute for Intcrnatlonal Eooaonto
Studi.es, Universlty of Stockholmt L972'-L9-
where $ n Prlvate seotor eavings
I a Private eector lnvestnent
G - Publio sector erPenalitrr€
f - publio seotot taxes net of subslctles
X E exports
M o inports
tbey point out tbat in the long nm {f)  (at f111 enpLoynent) tle private
geotorrs desire to accumuLate or cl'eoumulatg net financial weal'tht &s ex-
pressed. by S - I,  is eatisfied. [trus, the current account tl'eficlt (etT -
plus)tnthelongnnis.|'etermined'bya€ioverntsentseotor(2)d.eficit(sur-
plus) in excess of the private sector surpLus (aetfoit). In tbis, but not
in the length of the nrn relevant for the anal"ysie, they seen to agfee
with the  Now ca^mbrtd.gc  schooL posltion. Ilowever, they go further (and'
deeper) nith thelr theoretlcal analyeis. lfhey bring iato the pict,r€ &
ggggeglent}q4gglcong:llglgl,namelythefaotthattheg|overanentcteficit
bas to be financed by new.government bonit lssues (aa) (f)r  by the net craetion
of nonetarJr tase (dx), or by the ilisposal of foreign erchange reselvea (an)'
(ir) g-f=clB+dII-dR
l$ow, cl.epfrb.ing  on the fraction of the blilgat cLeflclt that the'8ov€rrn€nt
tlecicLes to flnance wlth one or the other of these eonpon@te'  the oupent
aecount d.efj.cit that correspond's to the govenrment bud'get ctefl"clt (ritren tUe
private sector does not want to accumnLate net finaaolal wealth' i'e'  when
S - I - 0)or tbat cortespond'e to the part of the gpvemnent tleficit tthich
exceeds the private sectorrs desire to accurnrlate net financlal realth
(ufren S - I is positive), wilL be finanoed by either a capital luflow (ttrus
endling up wlth a;1 overall- balance of pqlpents equillbriun) or witb a reserve
outflow (an overaLl balance of pa;rnents clefictt). In fact, if  the private
eector d.oEs not wish to aoguiro alr tho bonds iseusd W tbe government to
finarroe lts defloit, thoae w111 havo to be bought by the forolgn eector (e
capital inflow).
ffi?E;fflcEtlon of the oonocpt of the long n'r la this context gee Annex B'
ii'ttil' ;ffiii;i"6 anat ysts oogprlsLns alio thc ocntral bank'
boo r nore detilled, analysla and, orlttolsn ace Appendg B.
(3) ttcre B le the Part or go;r"ncnt bontlg whloh 1g not absorb€d, by thc oontral ba;1k.-20-
ff,  on the other hand, the g*overnnent clefloit lst financed' by a creation
of bage noney - either ilireotJ.y via an ad.nance o,f the oentral bankr or
inclirectly vla a prrrohase of public bonds by ther central b&nk - antl if
the private seotor le not wl).ling to holcl all  tb.e balanoestbue created on tir.is
new base, these balances will encl up in the forerlga exchange narket, where,
unlese they are acoeptecl as international reser!€sr they will be exchanged
against reeerves, therebyentail.inga clefioit in t.he overall balance.
Thus, the rtportfollo approachft goes beyond. the cunent account analysis
of the l{ew Canbrid.ge Sch,ool, and. exa,nines not einply the governnent  tnrd.gei:
as a possible determinant of a cument aocotmt d.ieeguilibriumt but also the
choice of how to finanoe the gbvemment clefiolt as d.eterrnlning the short-te}m
stnrcture of the balance of pa;rnents ln lts ourre:ntr capitall and reaerve
aooount componenta.
In the long nrn, the structure of the bala,nc,e of pa;rnents ie  deterninecl.
by the d.eslre of the private eector to hoLdl nari,ous asgetg and cr:nencies.  .l.n
ihe shorter run, the rrportfolio approaohn puts ernphasis  on the overall budgert
policy of the ggvernment, in the senge that a fisoar{onetfy policy(
not in llne with tbg_Efivate_eeotorrs  desire to accumrlate  money or with ther
foreim seetorr s d.eejlglg_gounuLate  the oorrntrlrts money es intemational
reservesr nust proiluce a loge' ln tes-ef\re-B-.-  As tltie si-
tuation ig not sustainable ln the long.-nun, the government rnuetr in such a
case, either reduce its cleficit, or increase the part of it  which is financed
by issuing bonds. llrlris second ohoice, howe'rrer, i,a also lirnited. sincet even :i.f
it  ls sna11, a country cannot float untimited. qurantities of bond.s on the in-'
ternational narket. In the sbort runr nor€overr i:f it  ls not very sma1lt it
rnrst aecept a;1 increase in the rate of interestt [Iowever, such an increase :[.g
not necessarily  an obstaoLe to  growth, slnoe it  :ls not oertain that the prr:,-
ductivlty of private investment ls greater than that of publlo eqrend.iture  o
In that senge the short-run effects on emplo;rmerlt and. growth of va,rious fisrlaL
poJ.icies are d.ebatable.
It  renalns tnre that the nportfollo approachtf and the l{er Ca,nbrifue
Schoolrs approach glvepfc.cnincnco  to tFc na,na&encnt of- tltP govcrnnont  btrdg€t
ovql--Ronetarv  DolicY-in the d  '
I
coo/not
(f) as opposed. to a rrpurerrfigoal pollcyl tleflned es a polioy rhare there in
no monetary orection induoed. by e budget defloit'-- al|
3 . 2 Pos s i bJ e gppl I peL! pn *!g;*-e*&f ql,lqrnq.  o i' .. gcglginip  . ltryign
De-enphasizir:g tire imprltance of  Lire exulianige rabe f'or $coitourjc aird
ldonetary Unlon doee not ruean dirninlshlng the impo:'tanse of pro'blerte of'
ba1ance of paymente adjustruent, and hence of the policies ained at faciir*
tating their solution. In a way, it  j.e unl.y tire *lctrene ruuriei,al'iet" prrsltiori'
eseentlally lnterested only in the long-*un equilibriunr that reall,v
de--emplrasi;s,the proi : *r: of exter*ral diuequtS i.bria. For, ir:. l,tri r;' \' r c,, " i,i'ii:
balanoa of pqyrnents j$ essenti&11y a none"tary phenonenonr  and., "*rth fixed
exohange rates, it  is determlnecl. by the relatlonship between supply and de-
nard. for monelr, utrile with flexible  exchange'r'ates, si:1rpiy a:id deroanii Jlor
Eoney d"eternine the exchenge rater &nd there is no balemce of pa..yrrents pro*
blem. t{encen monetary pollcy in one case is the inetrument for control.l.ing
the Level of reserves,  and in the other case for controlling the pri,ce level
andt the exchange rate. llith  the portfolio  approach (and. its  simplifled new
Ca^urbri,d.ge vereion) the problem of erternal equlllbriun is not de-emphasizedt
r:nless w6 are only interested in the extreme long run, i.€.  when the markets
for aIl" stocks are ln  steacl5r state equiLibrtum" In this viebrr the
giorrernment bud.getary polioy becones a determina,nt  factor for ensu.ring a
d.egired erterraal ounent aocotiJlt. Morsovert
the Eovennnent cl.efictt tleternrines the struoture of the capltal and reserve
-
aocounts in tbe balance of-LAyments.  1[hus Itharnonizatlonrf of fiscal policies
within the- fEonomio and..H-<ll|g,1q{t*lFrlon  wogld be iqeortant ngl so srgch for the
problenr of lceep:Lgs intprnal gqr*tJ,!Ii@  the nember countries
of the Economic
ancl. Monetarv Union with tlre reet o$ the wollcl. The enphasis 1g taken away from
the neecl to harmonlze  monetazy policies (that woulcl have in ar\y ease to beconre
uniqle in a oompleted Eoonomic  and. Moneta,ry Union)and shifted to that of har-
nonizlng truil.getary pollcles. llhe latter  would. be relevant lese for their d.irect
anil. ind.irect effect on aggregate d.emanel ancl enployarent, than for their impli-
catlons for net weilr,lth creation. Erorn this point of view, nonetary policy is
simply a particular way of givlng form to the net financial wealth created' by
the $tvernrnent sector cleficlt,  the other way being governnent dlebt pollcy. Thust
for a given current account inplied. hy the gioverment bud.get, a large a,mount of
capitaL noblLity among countrieg of the Economnic  a.nd. lfonetary Union would
allow anyone of them to financerinterrrally n'tthln the Econonic a^nd. I,{onetary Uniont
at least that part of its  eurrent account cleficit that corresponded to new bond
for the uhole of the Economic-22-
iszucs whloh were finanofug ttrc goverrnment defic:Ltr. Altcrnatively, the
usc of thc nonetary bases of ind.ividual countrie$ as forelga resorvcs by
other oountrics within the Econornic and lrlonetary U'nion would. alLow a country
to financs an ov€raLL balance of patrments dcficil; by issuing Eroney without
losing tcscflr€sr  Correspond.irrg  considerations ar:c vaLid. for capital
rnovenents ald regerrre flows, nhen aggrcgating all. corntries of the Econmic
and. Monctary Union and. consid.ering thcir overall current account position
with the rest of thc worLd..-2-l.-
4. pR0posArs FoR AcHIEvrgG IIURCPEAN ryOlfi,llAR{  UNTFTCAfION
4.i.  Ih-e.--q-*se f,":Ei-ropeqn @
The previous chaptels hal'e shown that, leavlng aside tire redistri*
bgi:ve effeete of'changes in the rate of inf,la'i;lon, changee in exchange
rato:r lra.re siguifica.nt effecte anly when money rigid"ities and i-ili.rsicns
persi-st and that arly such rigid.ities  eun$ jllusions are in fact of only
limitecl duration. One of the main findings of this report is thatt  beyond
the short run, initial  adjustments in the exchange rate ha.'re primaril"y
a nonj-na1 effect, i.e.  on the general leirei .rf pr"tces. The structure  and
growth,:f the econor\y:-n real terns are cnly temp*rariiy af'fecteC.. The
inrportant irnplication of this  idea is l.hat t
member  c after ilert0i:1" i;
s
is  abie tr; f
nd.ent mo etar-y pol *t,,r t  reai cost
rorn the ot "r.:ificant I  a:rd ext vie
trnent s em of
ri. ori  lti the oroces rnone t ar
d"eoend-s  o
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If,  in an ini*ial  stage, inflation  rates in the member countries con-
tinue to d.iffer, excharrge rate adjustments  are indispensable. Fixed ex-
change rates could be rnaintained only where the rates of in-
flation  were virtually  icl.entical in all  the countries of the Cornmr.mity -
otherwise balance of pa;rments crises would. be inevitable, Neverthelesst
ternporary and- erratic exchange rate fluctuations around the purchasing
power parity, triggered by capltal movements,  should be eliminated by
central ba.rrk intervention on the exchanges so that exchange rate fluc-
tuations reflect mdinly the differential  between rates of inflation.
rnflation rates in Egrope could", it  ls true, be alignefl on the rate
obtainlng in the eountry ln which inflation  is  slowest if  a system of
fixed" exchange rates Is a.d.opted arrd. if  the money i}lusion has been al"most
eompletely dlspelled.. However, if  the money |l]-usion exis-i;s, even for
what may be very short perioil.s when inflatlon  is gathering momentum and
for longer periods when inflation  is  slowing down, the ecorrgic and' social
sts of a rapid24-
If,  as a result of inflatlon rate d.lsparitles - justifiable in
view q:f the above remarlks - the authorities  would. be inclined. to
avoid. for an interirn pe:niod. the introcluction of totally flxecl exchange
rateg. firere is another oonsid.sration which t*ould. point to the rapid.
adoption of suoh a system, thie belng'the welf'a:re advantages for the Connunity
aoorulng from the use o:f a single currency. lhis ertrene call be compared
with the opposite ertre:ner'where each ind.ividu,al would i,esue his own
flourenoytr. Th€ lattar rsiturtion, a barter 6conor{y,
would be particularly i:nefficient. The situation ln whlch there is a singJ,e
cunency enhances welfare because the transaoti'cn costs involved. in a,ny
bnying and selllng operatio:n are kept to a nlnimrm thanks to the use of a
conmon rurit of account irnd. a conmon stanclard of value (uraxinization of in-.
formation) and to the e.limi:nation of sooiall,y unprod.uotlve transactions
between European cumenr:ies.  Such a solution is not, however, a possibtlil;y
in the imned.iate futr.rre sinoe it  wou1d. imply the prenature phasing out of
national cumencies  (si:rgle cumenc.y) or a poli'tioally and econonically
unacceptable alignmgnf, rlf lnflatlon rates in the immedliate future (fixea
rates).
4.2.  nonetar.v unifioation
Each country in the tlommunity  can be said., o:r assumed.r to have @
Itnonetarytt ob.iectiv.E. lF'irstly, the rate of inf.lllation nust be brought d.otrl.
This task can only be achie'reil gradually so as 'bo minimize recessionary
effects, anct this caLls for a system of free exchange rates since the ini-,
tial  rate of lnfLation :[n'eiach country is d.iffe:nent a.nd./or ginee the rate
-at which lnflation  slows d.ormr rnay also d.iffer f:rom country to country.
Moreover. a system of f:Lxed. exchanEe rates is need.ed if  adva,ntage is to be
taken of the fall  in transaction costs. A systern of fixed. exchange rates
couId. ultimately be crowned by a single lhropean crjurrency.
However, in the present rsituation, where eaoh country professes its  d.eep
attachnent to the Europea.n :iclea ancl at the sa.rne tirne still  wishes to pursu,e
national objectives, it  wou,ld Like to be in a poeition to exerclse its
national sovereignty whenevar ftexceptionalfr nat:Lonal oiroumstances reguire
an adjustnent to be nade to the general level o:f ltg prloes conparccl with
the average level in the ot.ber menber countriesl the proposal that nationerl
cunenoies be retainerl :ls, 'thereforer  nore reali.stio. Here, the !B[[9!-gggp,has pref err"a{- pqll!,Lgl*leal-i,s&jlq  q}r4.L qtq*y;*f,ron -e. g  pllv
viewpoint, agpgr betLg!_lglg[tggg. It  views Enropean  nonetary union
as aJ1 associatlon to wiiich each coultry belr:ngs becauue it  offers greate}
polit1ca1 a.nd economic ad.vantages 1mt which rsllortld alsc have during a
ir:*:.*:.tory period" safegrrard c"iauses (f) tirat czur he i.nvukeri wi'iettever bhere
j.r: an (rvurj'ii-irlg national jnterest a) thaug'h, in ecotlnil:,c 'Let'iu'er all over-
rirl1ng i"iat jgr:a1 i.nterest may prove ilJustiry; such sa.fegrrarr,l cle*ses are
feasible o11y i..l national currencles ax"6 reta.ined with an inpurtant ro1e,
hence the lilea of a European parallel cunency wh.ich vrould make this
possib1e.
4,3. Pqssibl-e..qo1iltiAqp  ill'yql  a Eqlo!qe,:l-,qarAll-e gil  g liv
The L\rrop*,an parallel. currency woirld *irsulate itr eaclr rienrber cguntly
as leg;a1 tender in the same way aB the national currency and. individ.uals
would. d-ecide how to d.ivid-e their aseets betr.;een the two curencies. There
are mrm6rous possible sehemes for a khropean parallel currency which will
be d.iscussed below, fn favouring some form of lluropean paralIel currencyt
the OPTICA group has been gUidecl by the twin oritsrta  of economic
effectiveness  and.  political  acceptability. We believe that the political
aspect, which ls  expressed in the forn of a national and" a European  resolvet
is  extretnely important,
By respecting this resolve, trhropeatr monetary unlfication couid even be
attained. moro rapidly provi'ded that safeguard clau.ses were retained' in the
Elrropean monetary system, which is possible  when the existencer or at least
thu@,oftherrationalcurrencyis5lararrteed.rnthe
final  stage, the member countries oould. stili  d.acid"e whether or not they
wished. to lntroduce a olngle conlnon ourrenoy.
4.3.r.
One possible form of paralle1 E\rropean currency was proposed in the
Masifesto for E\tropean Monetary Union issued by nine European economists
(The Econonist- of I  November 19i 5).
Fborn a purely economic viewpoint, the group consid'ers the proposals
set out in this Marrifesto to be perfectly sound. Fron an economic and.
'..1  ...
of saf'egrrard olauses are glven on page 25''- 26 -'
political  viewpointt we Enrggest less radicill,  ngradualrf solutions,
The l,tanlfesto opts for: a Ifuropean pa,rallel eur:rency with oongtant
purchasing  power. ft  nlay'[e felt  tha't this p:r6posa1 could result
in a premature aboliti-on of the reational cur:relncyr parl;ieular1y in
oountries with the hitrfieslb ltlflatj.on ratee lf  they cou,l.d not manage
to naster inflation.
The introd.uctlon itself  of this  1;yp* of ll\ropean parallel currency
could. intleett have a nj-tigr,ting effect on lrrfleition. If  one a,ccepts that
certain economic agenl;e piLay a particu)"arl;1 in-,rportant part in generating;
inflationr  ln so far er,s tireir erFecta*ionfl i,.r{:, l::l;i:rl-v ji"nflationary  and
a.ny contracts they conclucle, in the absence rcJl' a E\ropean Paral1.el
cu1'1.ency would contain a clau.se wherehy pr:Lc,os or incomes wcluld" be in-
creased. to compensate for erpected. inflation,  the fact that theee agents
will  then d.raw up conl;racl;s in terms of the .hrrropea.n paraIlel currency
of constant purehasing  power wilL remove thi;s major camse of inflation.
In adilition, anJr differences in. infle,tion ::aters can be offset by d.iffe-
rences in nominal intctresi; rertes paitl" on deoosits d.enominated.  in
national ourrencies,  'l;hereby restoring to ibh'ese cumencies  some of their
competitiveness vii-&.-vis the E\rropean parallel curtency.
0f course, if,  irr spjlte of the preced:Ln,g remarks, the oountries wit.h
the highest rates of j.nflation fel,t 'bhat their:' nationan- monetary €tov€-
reignty was being grailuallLy encroachecl upon 'their reactj.on might be to
lnvoke one of the safelgua:d. clauses yet to b,e laict down. If  they clid not
resort to such clauee$ but introd.uced" a st::i:n6:ient anti-inflation  prog?anmet
the social costs of such a, poli"oy, in the forn of higher temporary unem-
plolment, would be exoessilve,, Suc,h safeguard. olauses nay resultr for
exa^rnple, in comnerclal barrks belng refused. per:'mission to accept cleposits
d.enominated in the Errr:opeeur parallel currenc:f or in the imposition of
excha.nge oontrols. In orcLeir to prevent the emorgence of'such measurest
cLetrimental to the whole iLd.ea of b\rropean mo:aetary r:nificationt one would'
have to consid.er a par:allel currenoy whioh" rlurlng e traneition pertod.t
aLlowecl the natlonel currencfes most threate:netd to survlve.
fhe 0PTICA group is  1lu1Ly &Hare that ibhe 6olution propoeed" by the
authors of the Manifesto rvouLcl be more att:ra,ctrive  econonicall"y ancl poli-
tlcally  if  inflation had agsrured. even more alelrning proportions. I*' woul,lr
above all,  lenil itselll  to situati.ons of quasl*h;4perinflation, where hoYle-27*
tr*ry reform ilon * f,\1,i;pe&R acalerr vr,rui,ei. be called fOr in 0r*6r ttr
break inflatlonary  Bxpeotati-ons  ln suoh e way a6 to brlng the rate of in-
fla*ion in nersber countries down to a le,ie1 approachinry %eto and at
the eame tine convince  them of tl"re need f,:r a eingle natj.onal anct
European currencY.
4.J "?. ShsjtggSfj#f*i"s  qJ$Ieg%gs. aq *tig*Sg:*@
if  the proposal sel; out in the Ir:.rri.fe*to is,  f*r  the n*rrerli at
leasto pp1 at one srd,e for reaso*s ot pniitj-cal real.ism, it  v'rcruld. be
pOss,i.bie +uo 3l"€8te the European paraliol. *-l:".:':.l*;i ,l'r the bae:-s 'lf  cne
or: nore exj-strttg currencies in i:ne of the fr:Ilowing wii#s; o:r* tif  lhe
Coinmpnity curyencies to be chosen as tire l-,\rropeair  pa.r.:llleJ. cu:"rs::i*y; all
national currencies 'to ci:"culaie as potenti"ei paral le1 currenol.ec$  an
external curyency to be chosen, irotabi.y the dollar r"ihich is  ai-r"eai"y
used. in the Etrro-currency  marketr: as a llut*ilean parallel cr:rrerioy.
tbe acceptapce of a national curr"enc)" as the E\uope€m rlurrency
would be facilitated. if  the cnrrency of the eountry with the lowest
rate of j-nflation.- probably the Deutsche Mark -  was chossn. fnie solu-
tion bas much to be saiq feir it  in economi* terins lrl so far as the DM
is a recognized.  cumency in which those concerned. in hrsiness and. trade
have confid.ence. fhis  sc']ution, r"rhich is,  in a.ny oase, in the i-nitial
stages of implementatlon,  also has sorne d.rawbackel the psychoi.ogical'
effect of one Elropean corintry being seen to d.ominate the rest of Europel
the control exercised. by one E\ropean country over the European  money
supply; the constraints felt  by the country issuing the li)-rropean parallel
currency as regard.s the conduct of its  orrn donestic monetary trolicfr  in
so far as this policy would be subject to pressure$ from the other
member countries. It  is likely  that the same canflicts r"ould emerge which
characterised. the years f966-69 r*hen the United. States was un$uecessful
in reconciling the constraints  imposed by its  d"omestic policy with thoee
of an international monetary system based. on the dollar etandard-'  A
further solution -  lnter-clrcuLation -  would. be for all  Corunnnity cumen-
cies to be d.eelared. potential cand.irlates for the role of the f,\r.ropean
parallel cuTrency, i.e.  a solution whereby all  the cume$-ciee  qoUl{ cir-
culate as legal tend"er in all  the countries. In the immed"iate future' the
objections to the gJ$or,i  choice of a national currency as the E\tropean-28-
parallel currelrcy would not b€ vellct and. t,he cholce of the ttnost
stablert currelrcy worrld. rrltlnateLy lle with the narket. Neverthelesst
after a tra^usition perloiL during which several national currencies had.
been triecl. out as the Erropean para11el oun:ency antl clnring which con-.
sid.erable coets had. been incurred. as a res'u,Lt of the fact that nore ttta.n
two currencies had been in circulation as legal neans of pa;rnentr it
would., in the end., be the nost stable Eu:no'pean cumencyr r:niloubteclly
the DM - which woulcl be chosen as the Eu:ropnan parallel cunency. Howevert
the eane objections as ibhose in the prev:lo'ur,; paragraph concerreing the
cholce of a national. cu:lrency as the Ehrope:irn parallel currency could. be
raised. in connection wilih this currency.
A Euro-crinenerr  could also conceivabl'v be chose$ as the E\ropean
parallel currency. llhis would. involve "lg&i
at present outside--t-lle-liq4tr-o-l-ol-Lhe,losne-tery  authadtlgq. In this wa,yt
not only woul-d. a Eur:opeua parallel currenc:f be created., ht  it  would. also
be possible to contr:ol 1;he amorrnt of thls .E\ro-cunency issued. More spe-
oifioally, it  would be irossible from a certain date to have all  the
E\:ro-cnnency d.ellosjitg of resid.ent Europeaas redenonlnated. in terms of'
a parallel cumency,, ono rurlt of thie be:Ln,g established as eqtral to one
clollar on the conver:siorr d.ate. Howeverl th,e only way in which such a
Europea.n parallel currency coul,cl be created would. be for a E\ro-currency
to be converted, in a birncLing marner, into err new Errropea,n nonetary unitt
ancl. this woul.d. rnean thai; the Euro-currency whieh had been the starting;
polnt for the systen would. d.lsappear as surih.
We feel that this would. involve too mroh d.irigisme in the choice of
cumencies to be S!!  ard. lS{,  particular.Ly  where E\:ro-d.o11a.rs are coxr-
verted. for ertra-ConrmunS.ty transactlons. Mr)r6over, controls ooulcl be inp
posecl on Enro-dollars at E\ropean level wlttrout naking them into a Europcan
paraLleL crrprerrc;r. I.n anLclition, if  a E\ro-ou.menoy other than the E\ro.-
iLollar - once again the most 1ikely choioe j.s the DM - is chosen as the
European parallel- currency, the problems d:Lscussed earlier in connection
with the choice of a nal;ional cumenoy as 'bh.e European parallel ourren,cy
would. again have to be raised..t9-
4.4.
For all  these reasons, the OPTICA group talces the vlew that it
r+oulC on the roilrole be proferable io creatq a SSll curr.'ellcy '"o play
thr: role of ths paral1e) currelloy anri to lea-re it  ic lhe rnarket to
deterrni"ne 1t,s positirn rti s*h*vis tire ::at j-rnal citr'renci.es, r;lt tr ': one
har:li" -  nirri. l,ir-: jl.l:'r-r*or:l'rencie r:', on ttl*  fi iii',)l'.
gjls_ggllg!,  the E\ropean parallel cunency would have to be
issued agaJ.nst Errropean national cu::rencir:s otl a voluntary b*sis.
The nominal &uopean noneJr suppl.y uoulii not be affected by this  arrar"Jge-
nent and woul,L still  depend solely on the issuing pol icies of' 1rl:e na'-
tional central banks in Su::ope" Such cilrrency swsps r:otrld be carried cut
through a F)-rr.,:pean instjl.ulir,rn sucli rr:-r the H{0!'(r:r by each one af the central
banks of tlre Cammunity)" ro-a'fional rrrrri:ericie* aiqu.ired. by {}1is ilu'opea.n in*
stltutlon  goul.d cr:n*tjt,riie elairns lrr tlie cr.:.:r'!l'ai l:a:rks ivhicli w'::u-|'d aciually
be repayable in asgets held" by these banks.
During an ensulnqper:lg!, the rnember countries coufd d.ecid.e to set up
a E\gopean central bank whj.ch would issue the E\;ropean para1lel currency
by means of the trad.itional. monetary policy instrur:ents (open market ope-
rations, for example). It  r"rould. be n€reess&rXr if  thier European eeni:ra1 bank
eajoyed a degz.ee of rnd"eperrdenee at le,r.,'; :.:"':ri1e:'t,o th:rt of the'Burd-es-
bank. A rule relati:ig tq; aone-rar,.'i.iahii:f.',-  ircr'.rl.d. ,,;l,sc ha''"'e tit  lc applied
whil-st ensuring, for exanrple, tliat  tht rale *f  grcwth of the iilrrcpean
mone]r base d.j.d. nc* exeeed the rate n.l i.n:'r'+;:se in the prcdur:i*','e potential
of the whole Cci;rn::.n.ity  (see Chapier.{..5, p.32).
Tbe-jlry-qne-t ary sipq*Lrtd.'@--wral  Le l-gg{iery; ss*}d, havq t o
&-39€"-s.Be-L?s*-1h#lsl*j.te.*s*#g:Jt-*i*tAs-s-giipise*sllL.i*s-  {}1*-*{*-t:ge!:o{r
rate (r^rhich, ncre often ihar nr:t, woulrl probalLy be tne iil',{i; if  tnrtialiy
uational inflation  rates d.iffered. excessively, the Europeran para11.e1. currency
woull be introdrrce{. cnl.: during the transition period in the most stable
count:'i.es,  1'or example those participating in the Conniunl"'l;.1"t e:tcilari.;e
arrangements ( "snake") .
The OPTfCA group consid-ers tbat these proposals would satisfy the two
objectives referred. in Chapter 4.2.t  (f)  since the ttmonetary  stand.ing'r of-30-
I
tbe proposeil E\fopean para.llel curuency is  iapproximately equal to
that of the currency o:l thrs country with th'e lowest inflation  ratet
the risk that a natiorurl c;rffency w111 be f6rceil out of circulation is
rcduoeit; (fi)  at the rsa,ne tine,  the existe:nce of the lhrropean parallel
currency iurposes some measrure ofl discipline i:r the fight  against in-
flation in the countrirss with the highest rates of inflation,  and. this
isalsoinkeepingwitlrtheaimswehaireue:nti,)rr9d'.
Consequently, this Errropean pa:,,i].el curr.ency is  a, compronise bet-
ween two extreme solut:lons. The firs"b of these solutions is the indexed"
money of the Manifesto, whlch we cliecussed in. fihapter 4-,3,4tthe other
being that of a cugen,cy entireLy free frgm anlir ind"exation  agangements
ancl d.efined. soLely as ,a conposite 'baeket of lhrnopean national cuffencies
in a flxod. ratio,  suoh as the European trnlt of, account introd.uced in L97'.i'
The choice to be nade between thirc cu.mency anrl the existing national
currenoles would clepend on the re.lative exchaunge rate fluctuations  betwer:tn
them (i.eo orr the formula d.etermining the conlp,osition of the "basketrf aJadlr
ln certain forrnrlae, on the net e,ffect of delraluations and revaluatlons),,
on the interest rate paicl. on the 'uariotrs curre:ncies a31d on the cornmon
ourreaoy in Ihrope h6ving the ad.vantage of convenlenoe  in that the holtlltrg
of this ourrency  would. avoid. certain costs in intra-Fu::opean transactions:'
lfhe first  two factors lnay lenii weight to the a'rgunent in favour of the
national currenoies of countries with the lowest inflation  rates, while
the thircl factor, which wc,rkg in favour of the' European basket currencyt
would. perhaps be of less i,mportance, so that the E\uropeall oomposite cunency
would. probabty not ma}:e ror:rch headway in thel cc,untries with the lonest ra'bes
of inflation.
The cugenoy proposed. by the oPTICA group constitu.tes a bord'erline
case exenpllfying the composl.te rrbasket cur:rr:ncyft approach in so far as
each cugency woulcl ber eli.gihle to take part, with a weighting of 1'  In
other words, at an;r gi.ven moment, the baeket c:'onsists of only one Etrropeian
currencyt namelY the nlest'n'
Partial ind.exation oll the proposed- E\uopelan paraltrel currencyt i'e'
the rate at whioh it  i-s e:ccheurged. for a nati,cnal currencyr offsetet in
the flrst  solutlon, tire d.ilffarential in the ch.ange in purohasing  powert
i.e.  the d.ifference irr tho rate of inflation'between the cunency ln the
country with the lowes:t inflatiorr rate and' thrl national currsncy in cnr'€€itionr
. . .,/ ...- 
r.1
J-
Tire d,ifferential is  oalculated. frorn a given base d'ate -  the d'ate when
the agpeernent on parallel rDoney beoones effeotive -  in order to avoid
statistical  cLlfficulties invoLved in the Eeasurement  of absolute pur-
chaslng powers.
Another partial  indexati'rr FolutLon' not di'rectly ['ase'l o]'t c'lu--
parisons of natlonal purchasing powers, involves intnrd'ucing aJi exchange
rate guarantee in terms of the cumenoy which has appreciated nost arnong
the cqgencies taklng part in the E\ropean systen of controlled' excha,nge
rates (ttsnakett). The currency which appreciates  nost ls not always the
sa,ne national currency because, at tLifferent mo&enls in time, any national
currenoy may be in thie position, und.er thie trind.exationrr solutlonr the
E\gopean parallel cugency could. have a ttrealn vaLue other than that
derlviag fron the ind.exation mecha.nlsm  baeed on the movement in prices
in the different countries compared rith  that in the cor:ntrXr wlth the
Iowest rate of inflatlon.  Indeed such a discrepancy can appcer nhent at
least in the sbort n:n, erchange ratee d.o not refleot pulobaslng power
parities. Bowever, with controlled floetingr the erohange rates of tbe
different ourrenoies  oonoerned oould be kept qrrite closely ln line with
their  purohasing power parities.  Tho advantage of the solution gUarantee-
ing the exohange rete Le that tt'is  eaeier to pdtnto praotioc and makes
unnecegs&qf the difflouLt  d.lsouesione on the ohoioo of price indicee and
the ooord.lnatlon of thelr publioation.
llrhe 0pBICA gpoup feels that the choice to be made between these two
nindexationrt systens cannot be nad'e on the basis of pure theory: fuller
empirical unclerstard.lng of how exchange rates are determined' in the short
rr:n in relation to plrchasing  power parities (see Chapter 5) and also a
rretailed. cliscussion of the posslbl"e solutlons to the prob}eme tnvoLved
in the use of prloe indexes (see Chapter !  also) are reqgired.
The introduotlon of a E\lltop€alr paralLel cuFenoyr ancl in particular
that proposecl by the oPIICA group, will  have a considerable  lnpaot on
monetarL.relations wlth thlrd countries. the gfoup feels that this natter
is sufficiently  important to warrant a furtberr no?e detailed stud'y'4.5,
-72  ^.
With a vlew to ensur:Lng that; the proposecli b\rropeatr parallel curlcenoy
is brought into circulation gpaduall;y an& r*xit::ts alongr*icle the natiorral
clgencles d.uring an ilni*:La,1. peri.od" :ind. thu.t :l;he rafes of lnflation  in
the corrntries of Surope a:re i+li,grrcd, rlor*'nira:rd"s,  the OFI.ICA Epoup also prc'*
poees *hat the iritrod.rrction cif the E*:ropea:: p;:rrallel cr,rr'::ency be acc{fn-
panied. by a reforrnularbion of rnonetary p.tl"ir;'Xr:j-n each mrember'eoutrtry,
fiules on the rate of expansicin oll mo:rtetary ag:pegates thould alsg be Laj'd'
dovrn in the various countries eio *s t;l: nak,E a:rti-j.nfla'tion  trrclir:iesrlorhiclh
are often halrpered hy inf.latlor:nr';,r expec'tatr*;.:,  i.'i;i,rs oetng a.n aspec't oll
the money iLlueion), mor6 effectj-'re and al.so to ensuxe tbat the intenin
regime of non-fixed  e:rohange rertes orisz'a.ters mor€ smoothly" 'Ihey shoui.d. he
published. annually an<l shoull be quit;'e 'sirlctl.y adhererd to. idoneta;ry
nrles I  cuch as  thgse i:ntroduced. i.n Gernany at the end. of 197'{ arid' re-'
newed at the end. of I,)75r act 1;o r:orrest the' .formatiorir of inflationary
erpectatione,  thereb;r helplng dp"Hduelly to dampen d.own inflation  without;
generating substantial  socla-L costs, T'hey wc'u.Lil, at ttre sane tinet  maFe
for lmproved. forecasting,  anrl thue greater srtrebility, of exchange rates,
The ensuing phase in the constructi.on  of, the European rnonetary syst;em
cou1d. be one in which relati',re price stabili.t;y was aohievedr inflation
rates were brought into line and two curenoi,esr the rrational currenoy  i:uad'
the Egropean parallel cr:rency continued. io circulate in each country, I't
is then that the governmentd cou.Id. decic{e, i.f they so wished.u to achievat
full  E\gopean monetary rrnification, r*ith ther ad.option of a single cunelrrcy.
It  has already been enphasized.,,  in tLre d.isaussion of the effects olf
excharrge rate cha.nges in Chapter 2, lhat nton€rtary and exchange rate pol:l-
cies may, in some oountri,es nore tha,n others, offer a covert means c'f
carrying out a3 incomes pro1i,cy, ltris  ehoul.d. tre avoliled" tn a monetary un:Lon.
The policy of incorne red.l.stribution, both between the governmen,t ancl pr:lvate
economic agents and betweren income ::ecipien'bsr ,  should. be e:rpli.citly irp.Ie-
mented by rnea.ns of fi,scal. poi.icy ancl , wher:e ri.ecessary, negotiated  incomes
policies rather than impJ.ici-tly  thrr:ugh the j.nflation tttaxrr anri erpl-oitation
of the money illusiorr asr me€urs ol' rurd"ermini:r5r; the real. significanc€  of 'cor-
tracts denoninated irr money ternrs. .lntroduc"bj.on of the* paralle] cu::renc,y
licles-  {{ *
would. remove most of these tenptatlons sin*e it  would" be poeelble to
arroid. an infl-a-Li-rf,tt tttaxtr by resortf.ng to this: lese infl"a.tion-prone
cupefrcy and n,r::s diffigult'ta  exploit the lnoney ilLuul*n as *ontracts
nar;l"t be ,trenc;nj"nated i-n the paraliel cusre$cy ratherltran rn natior'aL
curreneies.
T1reye remir,ins the pl"i:blern of pgoqj-irl:a]  s.nd" structr:ral jnbalanoes
wlthin the gloyieta:"if 'rriiicl:r- AS haS ai.:'*:r.iy i:e *n rlxr6:lairiei-,  1;he prci:iem
is nct made a::y easier or aJIy rsore diificult  by'the ex*i:a;-lge r*t{
system. sotrving the problena gal1s fcr' *p*ui.fic taxa*ior.l,, tr:i:,:rsf*r arrd
structura) po).ici*s withj-n the uni'3n' liinte ,"i.,.ii fir&'hter has al :"eedy been
discrisned. exienejve),;' i:: rer:*t:.t, r*1ror"ii" Pl'*1ritg*d at th'e rrique$t cf tha
Furopeat: {jonrnunities (f),  thero ie no nead'i.ro go into i-t *gai* ir*re. In
keeplng wj"th the::as* of thia repol"t, rure v*c'uld ni*:"ely enphasi'ze"ilurt the
harmonj.zation of bu.cl,getary or fist::al p*'!'ie:ier: r"nd pub)"ic trel'lsfe:: poii-
cies within the union takes on a f'resh and irnpoltani  dj.mensiorr as a result
of their  j-mplicaticns f,]r the structure of tbe balarrce of pa;r'tentst  as
we saw i-n the rl"iseusslon of the pt'r'tfolic anc' lilert Ca^rnbrid'ge school
approaehes.
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5. SttccEsfro$s rCIn EMPInrc.aL vil)Rl(
Fron alL the analys:Ls o:f the preced.lng clnaptars it  is obvious that
there is an urgent need. for Erantltatlve stulien as a basis for evalrrating;
tha problen involved. in nov:lng towarcls  Eeononl"e  and Monetarlr Union. Indeed.l
the issrles are oredoninantl:r  enpirical a.ncl no auswers can be confidentl-y
eriven rmtil the avallablLe erriilence hae been mrch nore carefull.y screened.
---
The purpose of the preaent r:hapter ls to out.li.:ner irt the light of the
preoed.ing analysis, areas nlrere nore enplrlcal lrrowLedge is reguired..
Some of the suggestions whioh are presenteiL  he:re are flrrther d.iscussetl. in
Annex C which oounents on e:ristin,g evid.ence antl on relevant nod.els.
5.1  rate ohanges
5.1.1 On monetary effects
A naJor elenent in the analysis of chapter 2 is that exchange ratee
in a group of integrated eoonomies reflec'1b d.ifferential inflatlon
trends. tfhie cart be &seessed by analyzing rraria,nts of the pu{chasing
power parit.v tbebry. llorc speoifical-Iy,  'hrendg in (f ) consurner pricee,
(2) export prices of manufacturee and (3) unit labour coets, aLl-
correoted. for ctrangee ln effective (traae*eighted)  excham€€ rates,
should. be rev{.ereil caref\rlIy for the periorl since 1958. An a"nalyeis
ghoultt al-so includ.e a sulrtoy of uember corrntrieE (i)  effeotive erchange
rates, (fi)  tUei.r ratrg vis-aFvis the European unit of accor:nt, a^nd.
(iii)  their DM-rElEor
tlhe degree to which nenber conntrles are able t6 pursue partly
inclependent poLio:i.ee with respect to i.nt,sreet ratee and targets for
their nonetary base (or other aggregates) is a^n i.nporta,nt ind.icator of
integration.  Annexe 0 containe specific mrggestions on the interpretation
of eristing evidence on interestjete ha:monization and on the feaeibility
of sterllizat j.on poliriis.
.../.o.*.39*
,,L.2 On real effectg
An initiaL  stap is to rank the econornj.eg of Er.r.rr:pea,n Gounnrnj-ties
nenbers of gqgee of overall gPgglgpqr mehnilred as the xhare of value -
added, in sectorn expose& to lnter*atione,l competition i"n 'total SilPt
a.nd. to supplenent thie by lnilicatore of ths increaeing rc,Le of urtra-S0
trade in totel  trade flowg.  A seqr:rrd al*p ie to review to wl:*t ex*ent
the $qgn4iq4ylag$iallarl nodsl o{*ig  in an open e$onoroy as out-
lined tn chaptor 2 ls applicable to the eqperieucee of S0-econouies.
An ovalusti.on would be basail partly on bii'; ,  r',1'::'r,;,1y of e:rpor4 price a.nd'
unit labour sost treud.s anong moobers, partly on tha rolt  *f  wr:ges in
the exposed sectors ln setting a pattern for wage inureagss in the rest
of tire economyr It  'nould also be helpflrl l*or rnearruring tipormesiJ as waltr
ae for evaluating short-rtur effeete of cirarrgee in the exchange rate
tg Sonst{uct rte,flatore of vatue--aqi1e* i,rrj*e sheltered snd elg:P-ed
.gg$gAg. Cruclal to the f\mctioning of the Sca$dl.inavia.u-Italian  nod.el
ie aleo whether the d.istribution between wagae ard profi.ts reuains
approxirnately etable and, if  not, whether ghifts i:ave had. denonstrable
effects on the growth of the pri"vate capital etock ffld of output.
A second. and closely related area for enpirical r+ork is the meastre-
nent of noLay and exchamgs rate ll-lueioa.  How quickly do wage:', and prlces
- through intl.exing andr/or negotlations -  ad.just to changes in exchange
rates ?  What is th€ resltonee of nominal interest ratee to obeerved.
chan6es in inflatlon and. erohange rates ?  Is the gpvernnent deficit
sensitive to a change 'in the exchange rate ?
In assessing the soope for ertgryrql .acligglnsrgl through exchange rate
varlation the length of ti.ne during whieh a change in tlte exchange rate
affecte the current aocorurt is omcial. Enpirical work is becoating
available on the two countries that have cha^nged their rates the nost
(ftafy ancl tbe Unitecl. Kined.on), but it  would. be deeirable to suppLenent
it  by a etudy of one or two of the stronger currencieg that have tend.ed.
to appreciate. The issue of s;nnnetry tn reaction patterns also needg
to be stud.led with respect to price offects of excha.ngo rate oira'ngeso
Is there a net lnflation bias (ratchet effect) when intrar.Surope&n
excha.nge rates changel inflatlon i.n clevaluing countries acce)-eratrng by
nore than it  d.ecelerates in revaluiag countries ?
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5.2 FlsaalJoltov anal ertern&L adjustnent
5.3
The Etrateglc ro1e a,ssigpett in tbe tiner cambrtdiSe eclroolfr to the oovern-
nent d.sflcit in ehaping the curreut a,ccc|lrnt $alll's for ths constlalotion of
oonplete and. lntegratetl florrpof-funcLe accountg flor tbe household'' ootporatel
$overmant, banking  a.nd. forerig! eeotorst see Atrnexe B'  'Ihig task is obviorrsly
re!.I beyon<l the capabili.ty of the s,gloA groupf but a sirnp}er approach
fooussing on the bcbavicur of tbe of the nate
(S-f) roultl be ueef\r].. thjls wouLcl e1arlty whrgther the notion of a stable or
at least prectictabLe s-I  crrn be Juatifted. n{rir€&t ex4re}iences  suggest that
lt  lg not.  }Iork is aLreacly rurder way at the o:fficia]. leve] to ntu{r tbc
bebaviour of G - 1[ in nenber econonies ancl its  consistency trith an acceptatrle
oonstelLation of curenl; acriouvrt lnbalances :i-nsj"de the conmunity aadl for the
overall su$ent balance of :bhe ccnnrmrnity. lllhls group night help to sharpe'n
the analytioal approach acl.olptetl on the basis of existlng ilatao
A trlrlnar1y taslc is trO analyze trend.s i:r the European noney stoclc and' iu
its separate rational surrenciee anal Eurocurrenoy compononts' Particul-ar
enpbasis eboultL be given to the growth of Euromarket actlvity in Ec-currer:rcies
ancl its interaotion wit,h national monetary nea,sures and pressureg in exchange
narkets.
A firrther area of stud.y' are theflnetion?,I rFopensities to inflatet' cluri'ng
periocl.e of fixetl ancl flexib]e exclenge rates emtl illustrative calculations of
the gain (or oonversely', loes of seignloragetothe issuer) that woultl hav<r
aocnred to hokl.etg of rnariou.s fontrs of a parall.eL money relative to hold'ers of
national noniego Snch calcrulations  would. givel some inclications of the liilcely
speecl. of penetration  of'the, yarious forns of paralJ.el noney ard' of their
furbher effects"-}t
SUfiI,TARY AI{D CONCTUSIONS
Introduotory remarke
This report is  divided lnto five chaptel"s. chapters 1-l  survey
reoent theoretioal developmenta  On the role of monetary and bud-
getary policiss ln open eoonomiegr with emphaeis on their  impj'ica-
tions for nonetartrr gnion. Thls slrvey sets the stage for epecifio polioy
propoBalBr which are preaented i.n chapter 4. Flna1lyr ohapter I  brings
together a soriee of.proposals for furbher researchr especially of art
empirical nature, which seem nocassary in order to completer verify
snat quantlfy many arguments that -  due to the limite of the first  stage
of the stu{r -  could only be presented on a theoretioal or deductive
lEvel of analysis. Three annexes a,econpan/ this report' Two of thsm
(Anner A anct B) present a somewhat  deeper analysiB of theoretical points
disougsed in tbe report, while Annex c elaboretes on the proposals for
empirical researoh suggeete& in chapter 5. Ehie sunolary preeents tbo
maln oonclusions of the report in the follorring ord'er r
- E:rohange ratee and monetarry poLicies for internal equilibrium
-Erohangerategarrdlotherpolioiesforerternelequilibriun
- fmplioations for monetary rurification
- Role of a Parallel currenoY-38-.
Exchanse ratoe end monetarv poli@  qg!!!$13g
The main effeot of obanges fn tbe croheungo rate ls  permlesive in the Een6cr
that they allow each oountqy to chooee ite  own monetary poli'cy and' in-
flatton rate. Inflation itself  hag in the short fllrli '- througti the real'-
locatlon of resouroes  and the rsd.istrihutlon of inc,omes -'efI'ects on the
level of a real aotivity,  because of rrarioue rigidrt:les ln ths tenns of
oontraots and in anticipatione, in ehort money illusion.  If  reallocation
and red'istrlbution are importent objectivee' nonetarry polioies followed
by a change in the corrntryt s erohange rate oan be i *nn painful thal  income
urd budgetary polioies, which explains rhy they arer rcften preferred by
govornments. For certain eoonomists,  these ehort-rum effects influencet
poseibly in a perverse aense, the economic etructure and gronth of sn
oconony ia thc long run, an idsa, otbers do not sh,at'e. Noverthelesst all
menbers of tbe g.roup a€ree that the frequant use of moneta.ry stlmuli
followed. b;r erohange rate depreolation and dornestio inflation  makes the
short rrrn a1uaye shorter sinoe Bonsy tllueion ie, wealanedr thus rendering
these rnonetary Lnetnunents morc a.nd morg ineffeotirre"
Apart from theee permiosive, effeoti,  exchatrgie rate chaages can also
have, at leaet in the short run, an active rols in producing real effectet
espeoially through changes ln relative prioee betrelen tradeables and
non-tredeableg.  On the long-n:n effeota, the sane ctividecl' positions ae
above coexist betreen those eoon,onists for whom thel J-ong run is a succee-
aion of short nrns whloh iafl.uenoe the stnroture arr,d grorth of an econorV
rhflst  otherg deny sucb effecte.
Exchange rate and other polioieg for external equg]-ibrium
The position of the group is that exchange ral;e chan$egein the long
run, have a nominal effeot on er:bcrnal cguillbriurnl ln the sen8€ that they
allon the terms of trade to retugn to their tnlti'alL level in the presenoe
of differential inflation  ra$es. fhey oannot ehillt the terms of trad'e far
from tbeir eqlilibrium level.. Si.noe a good in16s16dlional1y traded has a
rorld price, variationg in its  lrrioe, atljusted for obanges in the exchange
rcte, tend to be similar in every countryl at leasl; in the long run. So a
oountrXr oannot, unLese it  hae eufficient welght in world trade  to influenoe thr
worl.d prices of itainternati.onal.ly  tracled conmodi-t:les, obtain a better
competitive position by usirrg the exohange rate'--19-
Even if  a country is unable to i:nprove its  trad.e balance by re-
d.ucing the prices of its  products ori tite wgrld market, it  is possible
that its  exports can increase or its  imports d"ininisir ilirough an absorp-
ti.on or real balance effect, via a reduction in its  total  demand for
goods. In terms of nnonetarist theory 'the rmprr:vement  in the trade
be1 arrce ccmes about besause economic agents leed to obtain rtnlley in r:i''llr
i: c, reccnstj-iute the real value of ttreir: castr baLa:::ces, red'Lrced in va"lue
by t,he increase in prices following llie ceval'aaticn. But the s,rrplus is
only' tenporary and nornally d.isappears when the real casLr balavrces have
been restored to their  former ler,'el. In other theoripr i:1i rhe relevant
pr,rpensitieis and. elasticities  have appropriate values) tite s'-t-rp)us can
persi"st if  tirere has been a permaneni shift  in re.l"ative p::ices'
So, if  exchange rates policies can only'be used for externaL equi-
librium uncler certain conditions then, for  some economi.sts, bu,Jgetary poii-
cies (the size of the public eector cl,eficit and the me'Lhods  chosen for
financing it)  must have powerful effects on it.  They argue that, in the
long run, the structure of the balarice of paynents is d-eternined by the
desire of the private sector a3d. the foreign sector to hold" vari'ous assets
ancl currencies. So the question arises whether overall budgetary policy oa.n
be a key-r'ariable in the deternination of tir* bal.ance of payments, a.nd es-
pecially of the eurrent account, for the short run. fh.is rriewr which has
been stressed. by the nNew ca.rnbridge schooltr and the frportfolio approacb'r is
criticized. as an oversimplification becauee it  rests on the assu.mptlon  that
budgetary policles have no effeot on national intereet ratest orr if  they
do have such effects, that savings a.nd. investment are not affecteel by
changes in interest rates.
Igplications for Monetar:r Un-ificatiog
If  the exchange rate is mainly a nominal variable, factors ubich
appear to give support to the use of exchasge rate changes should' be con-
sidered. for the most part as illusory.  Stated' in another way, this argunent
should lea.d. to the use of a stable monetary policy and. to the setting up
of a European monetary r:nion with fixed exchange rates. Indeedt if  money
creation is unable to have effects on emplo;rment other than in the short
term, the rtloss of sovereignty" due to nonetary r:nification would be accep-
table for a member country, unlsss the tf0omrnunitytr rate of inflatlon  is  greater-40-
than that wbloh the oountry uoule have nln igolatl,onn. In othcr rord.sr thc
problcn of, the crohange regine af,feote, on thc wholer nerely the 39@
nalueE of, the aoononlo union anel th!.s in mroh a uqy tbet the argunents for
aad. agaiast a nonetary union atre, ln a nutgbellr reduecd. to tbe qrestion of
thc a,rguneats for and a6alnst a, oonnon rate of lalllatlon. At the very nostt
oac oouLd f\rthcr enphaeiue tbe geins f,low{ng fron a firetl erobange rate
aydcn tlue to the greater ltgufulity of the ncang of pagment anilr lavcrselyt
the lose consequent to thls saoe fixlty  by thoee countries which want to uee
thc crohange rate lnstruncnt to attain oertain objieotives ln the fleld' of
distribrtlon polioy. Severt,helcas, thc feasibllityof attaining etroh objeo-
tivcs ie opcn to dtoubt anr[, a,4yray, they coultl bc aohievetl by the usc of
other iastnueats.  l
In tbe preeent Btate oll European unlfication, it  eeens that the
speed;r introduotion of a single ourrenay in E\rrope J"e tnappropriate, bscause
of the adjustnent ooets lmplied by harmonizing  inf.Lation ratee too rapidly
domra.rtls and of the politioal itetermlnetion of nabionsl autboritiee to malnr
tain tbc Dorslbility of havlng eur indqlondent nonctarry polloy. Eorovcr, for
tbc OPIICA group, noncta,ry unlon! 1g not deflaed by fircd ereharrge retcs or a
aingle curr€noy.
Indeetl, ln the flrst  chaptor of the reportr the g"oup presente an
alternetlve definltion of a moneitartrr union. Thle nagrr at first  read:ingr ason
to bc a definitlon tbat conetitutes a oonpromise between the fked crohange
rate pblLosop\r that ohara,cterizzed the l{ernEr Repontr ard tbe fleribLe er-
ohange rote phllosop\r of those inat oritloized tbat rcport. Eoraver, thie
reportrs definition is not'meant to be such a theo:eetioal conpromieer nor
to preeent an er-post rationral.isation  of historioa"L deveLopments concernlng
E\gopean  monetarXr r:nifioation. Ln the vier of tbe OfTICA BrmPr the erchange
ratc regi.nc, on rhioh European  ntoneta,rT unifioatiolr ghould be basedr is not
to be 6con as en uneLterable eLetment of the unlon :From the beglnningr but
ratber as en instrurnent whloh w1.11 allow prog!€Bs 'torar.dg flnal'
monetary qnlon to be rnade in an effioient and politioally feaslble way.
Conscqtrentl.y, the exohange rate reglne should itse.Lf be flerlble and evolvc
ylth the prooegs of monetarS, urj.floation to attain firlty  in a final state.
Ilorever, beoause of the va"riouE problems ari.eing fron unrertreincd
flarlbilltye  the group proposcs to redusc thc role of national oumenoieg
ln internatlonal transaotions tlrougb tbe introduoti.on of a Europeea perallel
ourranoy. Tbe Evallabl1lty of cuoh a ourronoy nou1d. furthcr linit  tbe
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effeotiveness of intra-suropee,n exchange rate changes and' nake ihe
occ&rreaoe of eucn changes less fregcent "
ftr budgrltary grround.s, the na.in lesson (even if  i:rdirect) of the
trl{ew Car*brid"ge Schoolr and. of the rrportfolio approachft is that erren if
th* tn:ir1get*ry str"ncture a.nd the wayr of fiazurcing bud.getary deJ':":its
r*1thin th* flommurrii,y are not consietent r*ith the desires of the 5;ubiic
an6 private saet*r's ut' eaeh couritry to htl-lC the money or bor:rls ';f' eaeh
other, they will  still  influenee national interest rates (in real terms)
enrl,/or naiiona} monoy creation' Changes jn theee variablet will  then
have *ffects on the structure of intra*}$nrll $;';;:*li baiauces of pa;rmentet
on rescurce allocation nithin tl:.e Sonnmrrnity,  on ratea of gr'rwth in the
short iand etentually in the lone) run and Bo on'
Role of a pargllel currency
The Brqlirninary  proposala of the OPTICA group for future steps towards
Ehropean  monetary unificatlon  a^re the follawing onee in terms of :i.te
targete and the means to achieve thern r
-  The targete of the nonets"rlr unificatiorl must from nclr* on be twofold.
&re targot is the progreosive  harrnonization and reduction of national
inflation rates. The other target is ths realization of the ber:rcfits
(in terms of lower transaotion and inforraation coete) of a fixed ex-
ohange rate systsm or, in- its  extreme formulation, of a sinpgle EUro-
pean currencyr
-  Tho neang to achieve these targets can be grouped lnto a nu.mber of
policy packagos, each congisting of eertaln policy measures.  The cri-
teria for ohooeing which package rould be the bset hsve been selacted
by the group on the grounds of eoonomio efficiency and poliiical. faael-
bllity.  As regards economic efficiency the(next) best etep would be a
ful-ly-indexed hrropean parallel currenoy; but the OFTICA gr$up has also
taken into acaount the polittcal  feaeibility  of such a propose"l  becauee
tha govornments concerned have Uuropean gu{! natlonal aimo : thr.isr if
national aj.ms -  nhich may,even for  eome tlme, remein the domlnant foroe -
are not taken into account, anJr propoeel for European nonetary nnifioa-
tion would meet strong politioal  oppoeitlon.-42"
The speciflo oharaoteristio of the grouprs p):ofiosa,l i.s tltat it  d.oes not
envioage the realization of the two targete in  slrcoessiver stagea (first
harmonrzation  and reduction of infLatlon ratgs by allowirrg for floatlng
exohange rateal and. then af,temards the introdurotion of el fired' elobange
rate sygtern with the poselbility of lntroducin6 r* s:!.nglo ourrency), Botb
targate should be realized simultaneouely in a nrumber of euccegslve steps.
The prinolpal vehicle for the simrrLtaneous ald elrolutlve realization of
these two targets would be the creation of a Europea[ para.L].eL emrrency.
The ms.in charaotsristic of this new Becond ).e6er1 currencJ/ for each country
should be a degrae of attraotiveness vrhioh is {:L{r$;'tr t!t* rrr$aeJi of the
Suropean oount4r with the loweet irrflation ra,terl and in cese of too high
a divergsnce in national inflation  rates, the trlu:ropean perralle.L currency
ehould only oirculate within those coufitries rhrloh have approxinoato\r  the
eane inflation rate (for instanoe among the rrgna.ks'r coun*rlee). Theee
proposals will  maintain national monetary sov'ereignty for  some time at
leastleven though it  will  be limited. by'groater discipline on the pricee
front.
Aa a polioy measure supplementary to the creati.o,n of a E\Fopearr parallel
cux.r6noy, the 0PIICA group propoBos that eaob. natlonal rnonetarlr policy dlould
be oarrduoted. aooording to a, nonotarlr nrle rherobif eaoh ,governnent
fi:es  and announces its  annual:rate of money erryaneion. liuch a rule r*ould
help to oorrect etroneous inflationary  antioipeltione  ande conseqr'rentlyt
reduce substantially tbe foosibJ.e unemployment  cost of a pollcy directed
at  reduoing lnflation .on tb.e one hand and" av'oj.ding axceesive ahort-term
fLuctnations in the exchange rate on the other hand.-41 -
AT{IIEX A
-
gHE MONETANY APPROACH  TO THE BAIAJ{CE  OF PAIT'IIXWS
Tb.is Annex showe how anil why exchange rato varlatlons substantlally
affeot the balanoe of paynents tn the short run. ]f  aleo deeoribee the ad-
Jnatmentmeohanig!which].eadstolong-termeqrrll-ibrlumlrithaxchang;erate
variatione  having a purel'y nonninal effect only'
This aratysis ie based on one of tho nos't reoant approachss to the
balaaoe-of-payments theorxr, namaly the rrmonet*,y approaohirl rhioh di"ffors
from tbs ntrad.itiona,l'r approacbes, nanely the alaetioity approa*h end the
abeorptlon apProanh.
The major hSrpothesea in thls ner approa'ch ane the fotloriug'  Firstlyr
lt  ie ageuned that markete in good'e and servtceB I'r€ quite highl-y lntegratcd' at
tiba international  l-evel rrith the reeuLt that there ls  a tendenoy for pricee
withln each bomogeneous category of internatlonal\r  tradeable good's to become
equal via an arbitrage, mechanism' Seoondty' the eoononies concerned aro char
raoterized by a situation of fu11 employment rather than ons of qnden-employ-
nentl this latter' asougption makee for a llne of argunent  more in keeplng
riththeqrrantitytheorytharrKeyneglantheorTrihichvou].d'bebettereuited
to sltuations of unden-empLo3ment'
The monetarxr appro"orr uae three featurcg. Firstly,  the balancc of pay-
mcnts is viewed &B a moneterxr phenomonon ln the senact that only the total
balance on official  settlemente -  equal to a glven change in resarvss and
thus in the monetary  baee -  is taken into consid'eration'  Attention ig then
fooueed on the dornand for  money. Provided' that  a etable money funotion
existsl  a.ny c::.1fli1eie;-1'of tlh:^*h arlses tretween actual cash tralancae ithe
exint:ng !:ncn*:;eilpnl"r'\ a,lld tha daslv'ed ierrel' of  ';ri'sh irai.r*tr*srr ltiit'  ilenrand
formone;rinssc,.:r,tr8i:iSi.lnsceS6ariiyhas*'i."tv1':tiiatein'ipai:''ri'':'rnarket
i.n the currency and cln at1 the othor marke  '  Finally'  this
imbalanoe on the market in tha ourrency wlll  be eriminated only afte:' a
series of periods beoauee the aotual etook of Cash cannot be adlueten to the
dEslred level lruned^iately. 
,,, i .. "*M-
glvon tbe tm rnaJor $rpothoees and th.e thrae f'sa,tureB of the noneta.rXr
epproaah nentloned abovo, it; is now poesib"le to nnCyea the effects of an
amhange rate change on the balnncrE of, payrnents andl on economtc u,ctivity.
Ta.ke, for exa,qr3.e, a dcvaluation. Other th:i-ngs boi:n6 oclualr thle raisee the
gcsraral lcnel of prieea in l;he deval.ning oormtty' 'Ihie inoroaee in prices
ie rlue tr: ons of th'e above }trypo1;henoo, namel;' thrlt tloncerning the arbitra6o
meobsnism rrhicir *peratos botwssn infernationaLly" tl':ldeabte gnotir.,
Sinao prioes have rleen, tlre d"emand, fcn mon,nry &Lso inoreaseE  andn given
a oonstapt noney supplJfr the deislred Level of aarsh ircid;"ngu :te hlgher than
thetr actual lsveL (excoss demand. for noney in sbook terne). To s$cumulate
the desirad level of oash, ilndl,ricluals will have to reduce their spending
(atd, if  need. bo, their boklingre of securit:i.ee *ro) (f),  ttru.u oreating exoeBc
supply on both the national and worldL markete in gor:rds.
At given prices (detennined. try tho rsorl"d markef), the exoeaB eupply
of goods ie orporbed, produoing a trade surplun ande oonsoqu€ntlyr a balance-
of-paynents sur?lu.s, all th:inge being eqtral. Thls errrplus ia refleoted in an
inflor of resernee whlch wlrilens the monetarXr beee and inoreases the money
ruFplJr thereby reduclng th,e ex,cesn denand for non,qy. Sinoe, €1E a reemlt of
the oba,nging pattorn of pre:fere:nooa, eotual stocks (money s'rppry) are adjust-
cit to the desired level (aermand for rnone5r) aurtng a ssriee of porlodst tbcre
rl1L be en ercegs demanil for noney rrntll. 1t1g ad.juertlnent procses has been
oonplcted (althoggh  d.enand 'wiil ooratraot steadily), thus reeuJ'ting in a oon-
tlnuing €xoegs $rppry of produots and, oonsequsntlye  a balsnoe-of-paynenta
surplus (A). Onoe the aggregate naluc of these intllowa of reseryee matchee
the inltial  inoreaee in tbe alenand for mon€yr eqpillbrtu 11L1 be ::estored
on tbe narket and thug |n the balanoa of paymente t;oo. Thls
rilt  nark tho beginning of tbc long run in tbs sernse tbat *he devaluatiou
rlLL not have had any Elgntf,lcant impaot (clthowtrr aE a resultr the d'eva-
lutng countw may havc built up a lefgOr stook of r€EanrgE In monsy and
real tcrms).
-
(f) fnfs poesibllity tn itlercganilcd ln tho
(a) lfc  cxooBs dlcnand f,or rnoney' la e 6took
goocle le a flou demand.
"rrfrra
follordLng tvo paragraPbe.
d,cnandr whtle tbm cxocsn arpply of-45-
fhe reaeoning le cltghtly Eorc oonplloated rhcn one ameldere thc
cffeots thc prooess riLl  heve on the otber oountrles. fbe qEoogB Erpply
of gooda in the devaluln6 oormtrlr utrst be netohetl by an erceas clenand for
goocts ln the rest of thc world. llhlg erossa demand Ls oaueed. by a fall  in
prioes. l{e hacl initially  aegu.ned, that prlces uould. riee by the anoutt of
the devaluation in the oolntr';f ln questlon. Eowovorr prioes ri}I  rlee less
in eo far as the exoess supply of gootle leada to a fell  in prtoes on the
rprlcl market anc[, ln tha national ourrenoXr in the rest of the rorLd. toot
yhere the denand for noney vill  then bE eeen to oontraot. AB exceBs tlenarrtt
for goodsl cosontlal if  the balanoe of paymente rtth the rest of the world
is to ehow a defloit, r.iII  oorresponct to tbe €toess supply of noney'
The soope of thls adjustnent ncobanisn ooulcl be nidened' f\rrther if
aooouat was aleo taken of oepltal novancnts anct the c:rlstenoc of noa-t'rar
deable goode. The firet  faptor inrpLies that the tonporar;r inbalanee on the
narket for tbe ou1.3enoy alco produoes  aB lnbalanoe on the sconrlties narket
(in terne of tha ef,feotLve anrl ileglreil stook of, sequlrltice), thus giving
rige to an lnbalanoe oa oapitel aocount (for given interest rates). The
geoond f,aotor nay perdit a tempora,ry ohango in tbe relative prioes of tra-
deable and non-tradeablc  gooda,
Botb faotors f\rrtbcr oonplloate tho sltnetlon ln thc short nrnt
in that they reqglre oongideretion  to be given to other siSnlflcatt effeete.
Neverthelea6, aooording to thd monetar'1r approroh, tbe iaitial  stock of
securitlea (in real terme) and aleo tbe inltlal  relative prioea of tradcable
and non-tradoable  good.a 1111, ia the long rngr, be restored.-46-
fr'NCEEANY  POLICT AI{D THE ADrugr,I[Mrf  PROCESS
Thc role of, br'ltlgetarlr or fieoal potioy ln thE adjustnent proceec bas
becn eranined earLier (pp. 17-20)r partioularly wtth refer€nos to a nunber
of rEoent theories (n!|er Canbrldge Sohooln, frportfolto approaoht'). The ain
of thle Annex is to exanine in greater detail tbeee theories of the rols
played by h:tdgetary po)"icy in eh$rt-tsrn econonic polioy and, consequentl;r,
in ooordina*ing  thc eoononlo polioics of tbe nernber oountrins of the E\rropcan
Connunity, It  rill  algo nrention a nunbsr of aritioisms whi,rrr may be levclled
against theee theorieg.
To gunmarize the poeitione in queetion, it  eould. be eaid that thc
ibuctgetary  theoricgrr (for reasong of simplioity, this is how re wilL rcfer
to the theorlee nentioned. above) suggcst thc foLloring type of noptimr:n asalgn*
nent  of ingtrunents to objeotlveer (tpolioy nirn) : budgetary polioy nust
be used to maintain external eguiLibrium (tractc balance or balanoe on ourrent
eooount)  ancl the e:ohange rate nust bc sat  Bo aa to naintaln iaternal cqul-
libriun (employnant). In oontrast, thc optimum pol!.oy mir proFoged ln other
nnonetarigtir or nKcsrnceialtt approaohee aigbt bc su.ma"izld. ad follore I
use of monetary pol.ioy to ettain the d.omegtio obJcottve (tnttation), use of the
crohange ratc to attEin tha.srtsrrral o.bjcotlve (overall balanoe-of-paymcnts
eqtrllibriun) ana pcrbapal for tole, uss of bud,geta:ry pollcy to attain the
cnplo;rment objeotivc.
It  is lmportant to aesess the eraot aignlfioanoc of tbe nbudgetarg theo-
rlcttr forr if  tbeir oonolurionB a"r6 re11-foundcd.,  they rould, bave fundanental
lnplloetionE for the oountrles of the Europan Conmunlty I for lnstanoe, to
thc crtent that crobange rates affcot the lcvcl of enplqrncnt,
eny clcolaion to dlspcnse rltb the crohf,rgo ratc lastnrnent rould, not havE
thE Eane implioations ln all thc oountrlcs. tfhat is norer if  it  is true
that theounent aooount 1r dctcrmincd $r tho budgpta4r balanoc, perbepo
thc moet urgent taEk faoingl the oountrlce of the Europcan Courrunlty is
the ooorctlna,tlon of, thelr budgcta^:qf polloicc ro as to avolil a4r ourrcnt
aooount lnoompatibllity.
at{l{Ef B
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1. @-eoorlonl.o  cqullibriun
the rbuilgetary theorlpn of adjuatnent :Lg ba,seat on tbe colraideratlon tbat
Eaoro-eoonomio  varieblee are, ln oertain nespeots interdependentr 88 18,6
ncutione4 in the report llpp. 18-19). The'llable beLou provldac a nore oonpre-
hearive piotqre of thls lnterctcpentlenoes  tbe sEctors being llsted horizon-
tally ancl the"goodgtrrrert:lcaffy (:-).
Each box in tbc, bable !€p,.*L;,;;;:, '., i.he €xootir" demar1d " one ge;tor j'rt
a given market.
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I-S
an$
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Produots and
gerrrioes
Depoeit  monoY
entral benk
8s
Scouriticr
(f) fUe table ooatalna  a, nunber of rlmpLifioationg in ordcr to highlight
the essenoe of1he thaory - for e:caDpler, zeros have been ingerted 1n a
nu.nber of pfaoei i tho"r- it  ls asfllned. that thc oonneroiel barrks and
the central bank do not purobesc gooda, tbat the govcrn'nent doEc not
rlab to *o.-ottt"  toney, that tbe crtcrrnel sector docs not rich tt1
aool.utrlate tbe natlonal. ou1-3enoyr that tberc a.ro no banknotes (eU
oenrtraL tanX ioney bcing nadc up.of thcr roEervcs hclil by the ootmeraial
ili;l,  *a tu"t irivat-  inittvitluals, tihs oomeroia]. balkg and the govcrn
meat d.o not bolil ary forcign Gurrcnoy. Tbc thcory nould nott of courset
be funda,nentally Jleotea if  the"e atqrllfylng aarnrnptionc rorc droplled.
The qrnbol.e repreeent the follodng var:iebles t
I:
St
Gt
lIr
I:
lIt
Ar$ t
Ail8 S
invcstncnt
eavlng
publto erpenrdlture
publio rcvenruo
exports
lnporte
oUrng" i,n the private sEotorr ! aoucJr supply
ohurgc i,u thc noncy rupply nado avallebLe ty thc oomcrola.L
banks
H r  Erantity' of ocntrel bank noney ('nonctery bare)
R t  f,oreiga erolunge
B t  scooriti'ce (purrffo or prlvato)
(eec pago 4?a for tbo oontiuuatLon of thls footnote)
. . f",,-47e-
(oontiauatlon  of, tbe footnote on pa6e 4?)
The lndioes refer to the folloring  r
d t  demand
s t  srlpplJ
p i  private gsotor
o r  e$umeroial benk eector
a g  i'*xternaLrr gcct*r
b l  u*:ntrai bank
g s  gcvernmcnt
d
Thus A 3f, rtanda for tbe aoounirlation of
the contral bank, f!  tfre Eupply of publio
of privats aconrLtleu; it  ig agzunsal thst
are fully interohangeable.
publio or privet-r Baorrrltieu  b,':
securltiee, ana tj  bbe suppty
publio and. prlvate gaourities
The damand itens arc ua.rked rdtb e h+n siga, the $rpply itens rith a ',-r, Bigni
Clearlyr a varia,bls ropreBentlng a ctook ohangc ytll  bc poaitlve if  the
stook lnoreEEeg and. negatlvc tf  it  falk.-48-
[bc aggregetc of thc bores ln a.qy ons oolunn reprctentg the budget
oonstraint of onc aeotor andr slnoe the eggrcgate of tbe aroeee denands of
aa agcnt ot a g:roup of a6oatc ls bound to be z€ror lt  oonstltutce an identi.ty.
Ia other rordso if  th* brghavloult  J\::rr#l:i .i"'.., ,Etr':b'i",; halg *$i:1 ; ir$:rrinb.lc' is  de-
tcrulnadrafc ana\ysodr tlno b,Ohavlemr l,e$'&,erss us,iil ile geetr t$ il:E $$etrr,ssi*rii.v
lnterdepcnd.cnt f,or s giv'an ooonotd,c agant or:for a given Kl'nup of agents.
The Legt oolunn rerpreacnts the balanoe oll pa6rments o:f lbe aount4r in
qrrestlon, inoluding the ohanpp ln laterrratlonal rsssrv€sl it  also sums to zr0?or
Bhc ganc lc not tr.lrc o:f varlebles in thc sanc horizontel line ainoe,
olaarly, no budget oonstralnt ltnks thc cx-antc dcnande for or arppLies ln a
glvcn markct cmanattng.fron cllffercnt agents. Tlrc cr-post valuce reoordcd. for a4r
ptoduot arcl of oourgcr suoh that the aggrcgiate of the nrppLleg ls cqual to
tbe rggrcgatc of the denandrs but there ig no xey of telling rbcthor tbeae
values oorrclpond. to thc cgrullibriun valuer orto the valuec deeircd by thc
varlour derundcrc and suppliorr at nrllng priocB. But tbc lnporta,ut thing
ir  to loor rhetber e nrrket iis j.n egtrilibrlun, i.o. rhethcr thc deslrcd,
overall denand for a produot ls eqral. to the dcslrcd overall arpply of that
mnc produot. Aooordl.ng\rr tha aggregetc of, tha nelueg in e 6lven horigonta,I
llne la acro on\r if  thc narkot tn gucstlon ig ln egullibrl.un, l.c.
tf fhe variobles rhloh deterndno thc suppllsg o:f a,ad denrncls for that product
have values cuoh that theee oupplies and dcnand.n ba,Lanoe out. For instrnoc,
thc.flrct horisontal llna shore that the pnoduoll oarkcts ooaoerned are ln cqui-
llbrlun  if  thc a6gregate of the dlffsrcnoe  botreen the desired lcvel of
s6ving and the dcsired. levcL of iavestnentr the budgctartrr  balanoe end tbe
trado bElanoe is lero. Eorevorr a theory oan be dlgousgcd on sound baseo  on,X.Jr
aftcr thc bcbavlour funotlons of tbc dlffercnt agcnte lnvolvcd, hevc bccn tdcn-
tlflcd.
She teble rhorrr fsr cxanpler thet the oerrtral bank issucg noncy ln
erohaage for forei$r ourrenoy' (forelgn uonqy) ot: scourltiee (publ"io or prlvurte)
gnd. that tbe budget dcflolt ig flaenoed. by iesui.ng geouritlea aoquircd by
tbc prlveto rcotor, tbe oome,rolal benke, tbc ocntrel beak or tbe ertsrnel
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lcotor, cto. Ilorevcr,
srdr oonscqucatlyr uJr thcory or rnlr prcrorlption of polloy Ecalurcr based on
.  tbis table elone (or on elnll.ar, norc rlnpltftcd tablea)' rlthout tbe asaump-
tlons nadc ac rc6erdl thc bchardour of thc dlf,fercnt ccotorc baing spcclfi.od,
lar on thc faoe of ltr  toneuhat euapcot. Eoravcr, a.ngr analyclg rhioh did not
talc lnto aooorurt tbc oonatreinta hlghllghted iu euoh e teblc rould elto bc
lulPcot.
Consequcntly,  it  yould, be bighly deslrable that aqr eoononio polloy
bciag forutrlatcd or ray eoononlo foreoaat being dram up rhoulit be deflnrd
rtthln a frencrork of thiE kladr tn ordcr to snrtuc thet tho oonrtraintr of
thc ryrtcn rtrc ralPcoteil.
lhe aodcl lct out ln tbc roport (pp. 18-f9) h  tho forn of cqruttonr (t)
enA (U) le e slnplLfioatlon of tbla tablo; the acutral bal.k and thc govcrncnort
bcla6 songidcrcd as onc and thc lanc gcotor.
2. Critiorc of thc tbudtcta,ry tbaorlcri of adjustncnt
Ar ls gtatcd. ln thc natn bo{y of tbc report (pp. 1?-2O), tho f,cr
Canbridgc gobool foou.rcr ltg attcatlon rolcly on the firEt borlcoatal llac
ln tbe abovc tablcl ybcrcar tbc nBortfolio alrproephtr Ls nore rogltirtloatcd
rnil .takcs into aooount tbe publlo seotor hrdgct oonstralnt (tbc oolunr
rGoverancntn and tscntral brdcn in tbc tablc). Eorovcr, the ga,no beslo ori-
tlolen oan bc lcvcllcd et both approaohca, aencl,y that tbcy lnpllottly rstlltc
that thc otbcr vr,riabler (for uanple, thoac nbtoh eppcar ln thc oolunr
nErlvatcn, r0omcrolal bantcsr anil rErtcrnalF (f))aro not effcotcd by ohalgrr
tn tbo varlablcr analyrcd., i.c. tiorc nhlob aDpcar ln tbe flrst  horlzontel
ltnc and any uh.loh rppcar ia thc ooluoa roprcrentlng the publlo ccotor budgd
oonstralnt.
..r/...
(f ) It  rcge,rda thc nctcrnaln rcoto!, tble ernurytloa can bs ilcocd villil"ln
thc oerc of a saLl eoono$r tradlrg rvttb tbc rcrt of thc rorld" Eoucvor.l
!.f, onc le to thc
,
oorntrlcs; omunLty ar a olosod erce or if,
onc ir to rtu{y the Europcan Comrmltylt rclotloas vlth tho rcst of, tbc
rorld..-50*
Fron tbe relstiona erlstlng betrccn tbe varlablce in tbe ta,ble the
follorlng eqtratlon oan be fomuLated.r  tbe govcrrneat acoount and the ocntra,l
bank aooount being ooupled togetber t
o-r.48  -Aa+ (Ar! -A4)
lnrlloetlng that the publlo dcfioit oorreEoutle to monetarXr baee oreation, .Logg-
as of, forclgn erohaagc rosctvoa and,for purohase,s of publi.o eesuritiee !y the
prlvate ceotor, the oorunorolal bankc or the orte:raal BGot,cp,
Fqrtber, using the oonmeroial banker esne*nsint an 't,h,* equilibriu.r oon-
ditlon on thc seourlties marketp $o oarl rrite  r
o-r.au;  a,B+ (ul-n!)+ A3"
inilioating thlt tbc pubL:l.o def,lolt oorr€rlronds to noney ore*ted blr thc oor"
neraiel banks, a oontraotlon in foreign exohd"ge r€Eerves and./or purohaaes of
publlo reouritleo by the prlvate seotor ancl. the ertarnaL Beetor.
Theae varloug eqnatlona nercly indioatc thc poaslble raye of finanoing
a publlo dcflott and, oonecqucntly, a trade deftoit @)  t
but tboy do not d.egorlbc the ertcnt to Sloh eny onc variable ls affeotcd..
llbuc; ln ao far ar roar! of tbc pubtlo acaurltice aer\r isarect to flnanoe
thc burlgct deflolt arc purohs,"pd Uy thc prlveto :cotorr it  1g lnpontant to
hw  r\y and bor thlg ls poaslble (e.g. W altoring the lntercst ratc) ald
rdethcr or not tbis e^ffeots. Bavlag atrd invcstnontr ylth the regult that the
ohangc in the trade balanoc r'rould aot bc cxactly equal to the chaago in tbe
budgptsJry out-trun.
If  thcre probLcns arc llo be rcrol.vcd, it  is oLcar that a d.irtinottoa
nugt bs radc bstrocn tbc long nra aad thc ghort nur lDdr Lf posalbler thet
tbc duretLou of caoh bo neamared cnpir{.oally.
At uru,al, &_fggE_gg  d,ocr aot posc too nany problens r therc crlgts an
cqulLtbrtun portfolto, lmplryilng a rpcolflo veluo for tbc flors. Thue,
ln an coonony !4!Lqut, rrorthr nclthcr a publlo itcf,toit nor a tradc dcflolt
gc fceslblc ln thc long rone E! tb,ey rould. bot,h cntall a ctcady aoounuLation
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of seourltter by the oountrlrtr prlvatc scotor or br thc crtcrnal scotor.
-ln I'nfletlona"ny cltuatlo,tt provldec an erocption r for instenoe, the valuc
of aasete rhich a^:rc hetd by tniltrrlduals and repreaent olaina on tbe govern_
nent oannot be nalntained tf  the govcnrncnt ls not forever lesging ner
leouritleu| slnilargrr thc real naLue of uonctarlr olaimg held by the crter*-
na1 teotor vle-l-vls a oountly lasulng a, rescrre onrrenoy oannot be meia_
ta{aed rltbout that cou"ntry herrlng ooatinually to sell surreney to the
other countrles, i.o. wltbout it  nrnning a belance_of_pagrmentg  d.cficlt (f).
rn a trowlng ceonoq[, horgver, it  rould be rrong to thiuk that thc
publlo def,l.olt, f,or eranpre, aould not be nelntained, eveu if  thare raa no
inflation s lf  eoononio agents, rhether rerld.cnt or erteraal, etil1 rish
to hold e variety of gcorrrltleel the pubLlo acotor oan oontinue to eelI
seourittee to the aatlona.l prlvate ceotor and to the erternal eeotorS sini-
lerbr  a oountr';r oan nornal\r oontinue to scll scourltla s and./ot ou1'1.crL
oy  (e.g. the United. $tates; nhish produoer and sclls d.ollare).  Ehe budgct
or trede d'cfioltg or mr;lr.useg then refleot en cqnll.lbrl'n1  and a.ay atteapt
to oorreot thcm rould 4ot oaly felL but iouLd also generate disegnlllbrla.
Aseu"nlng tbe gounalnesg of tbc tbud6ctary thcorLccn (turs rrill  be disourscd.
letcr)p tbere rould sttL1 renaln a probleu of cooaonlo potrioy ooo:rdlnation  I
the eqrlllbrium altuation tlgniflcr that the govcrnnent ie not cceklng to
run a budget surplus or deflclt largcr or snaLler then tbat rhioh corresponde
to thc needs of the national prLvate ceotor arrd the crterael sector. otbcr-
rleer thc belanoc-of-paynrcnts  Etruoturc roulcl vcry probabty be affeoted. ia
an undegirabLe nannor (as a reeult of rdllob trade nay craot\r balanoc).
. .. /...
(f) rlrs  reacontng ie oorrcet only tf  tho intcregt rate peid on olelnt.1g.ilot guffloient to naintain the real vaLue of aagetg, EorivEr, lf  it  ig assuned. tbat the interest rate is lnd.cxed to'thc rete of inflsti.oa (and that an lnterest rate natohlng the lnflation ratc ic pald, on nonetof urfani"g), a oonntr'Jr doea not have to nskr e real trUaf,or in ord.er to rcetone tbc rcal va,lue of lta noneterv arrd, flnenolal a.seettl f,ron thia point oi vfeu, horeverl tbc statlstlog nay bc nislcad,lng, sLnce thc pagrneni of, the inte- rcst rate to oougiuraatc for thc lnflatlon rate c1rpoEpe in tbc ou$ant
aooountr  Eird tbe flow of olalus nhiob cneblcg tha reel valne of altctt to ba naintained and rihtoh ia finanosd W the paylent of thE iatsrest is shom ae e oapital or nonetalSr f1or3 i.n other rord,s, d.epcnding on tbe forn the trangfer talccs, thc belanoc on iunent aooount 
"nafot 
thc- ovcrall
balanoe of, paynentB tray d.iffcr. Sinilar reasoning ooula be appllect to the
budget.*52-
Ihia 1g bor the oroblsn of oooJdinatinr tbe-Pud*etdrr polloicg of t,he
oountries of thc E\uopean Comunily oan be v1e$4, To resolve the probJ.ent
re ruet hlorl in pa,rtloulal, ths reaeoas w\y ther differeot oountrieE acou-
rll.ate seouritles  and cnpenoieo. In tblg oombotlonr it  oan elso be cn-
pbasized that, genarally speakingl budgetary pol.ioy ls franeil aooording to
eggcntlal ebort-tentr rcqutrenenterwbersae  only long'tern objeotivee  ehould
be oonsi4ered : the najor rol€ of budgeta,ry poli,ey, i.e, the tletertnination
of the aet budget poeitlon, ie to transfer purohaslng porer fron one gen€-
ratlon to another and f,ron one oountry to snotherr.
If  the long-term vier is aitopted, therefore, the oonolusions rcaohed
a,rc sitriLar to those arriqeal at rith tbe Fbudgetary theoriegr. At the sapc
tlne, lt  may be cnphaslaeit tbat these ooaolugion,g resenble tboge reaohed
in the stu{y of nonetar5r polioy : in the Long rr:ml nmetary or budgeta.rT
po!,icy is ltineffeotivertl in the scnEe tbat thc rcaL oa,sh vcLuc of balanocsruublig
indebteilncea, cto.  ls detemined b;r ccononlc 56;enter whether national or
erterrnel.
In thc Ebort nrar houcvgX, budgetary poLioyr llko nonctary polioyt
nay be terned neff,ectivon. And yctl in tbe sanc ray as or.G oannot infcr
f,ron tbc fEot that tbc erohangp ratc and tbc EoD;6/ supply a,re purely nnonin*ln
variables that they canno't ureftrlly be cnploycd. for short-'term econonio
polloy purpoBos, ono oannot infer fron thc notio,n that the bud.get d.efioit
and, tbe trade defioit are llnked in the long nrn t.hat it  ia budgeta.I;y policy
rhlob, at anrr tlne, determlnea tbe trade bel'snoe.
fnoldcutallyr the lfler Canbridgc Sobool a,pproaoh oontains an anbiguity
rihioh ghoulit be oleared. u:p. Aooording to thls ap'proaoh' tho tradE balance is
deternlncd by the budgstary baLanoe anil the crohamge retc nuat bs ueed to
lnfLucnoe the levEL of eoononio aotivlty. If, the Latter aseertlon could bE
erplained by the faot that a ilevaluatloa rould. prodlroo a poeitivc variation
1n thE tradc balanoc, Lt wouLtl be tnoonslstent uith the propositlon tbat
the tracle def,iolt dcpencle soLcly on the budgeta,ry clefioit. Perbaps i*  oould
then bc aesuned. thEt a rlevaluatlon regults ln at :Lnorea.ge in the gcucral
level of, prioca. Eorcv6r, it  oould, bc deduocd.'that thlg hacl a posltive cffeat
on cnploXment only lf  a reLationshiB of thc tPhlllipst ourvst type rae
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esguned to erlst 0n tbe ooonorry. But it  socms tbet no enplrloal relation-
ehip bao been tltgoovered betreen tbe levbl of aotivity anct tbe exohange
ret6. It  woul-d, hotcvere stlll  be possiblE to argus thatr lf  the publlo
dcflolt ilitErminee the trade balanocr the erohanSo rater for ita partt
tlaternlnes the rate of inflatlon (1). Sone of tbe autbors of tbe Ca.nbridge
Sohool approach ta^ke the vierl bowever, that the lnflation ls not sufficient
to offset the produotlvity gain whloh erporters derive fron a devalu"ationt
go tbat the effcot on grorth is poaitivE.
Tbe fr.rnda.rnentaL  objaotlon tbat lt  clieregarilg geveral. poseible effeote
of a, verlation in the publlc deflcit on tbe neoro-dcononio varieblee, such
ae those given in the table gboves can be nade oonoerning the relatlonehip
betreen tbe trad,e balanoe end the ehort-tesn publio iteflolt. Thue. the
tion that oonstent ls of in the
nbudgetary t,heorleetr. It  can, horever; be guertioned.
Firstl at the empirioal level1 the asgutrption ls gusstlonablel aince it
is d.lffioul-t to fincl a stable invectment firnotionr i.€.  ot16 rhloh oan
gattsfaotorily splatn the behaviour of iavestueat. Even if  the eavlng
fiurotlon is ooaparetively noro gteblel lt  le probablJ not etable enough
to provide an irrefutablc bada for tbcthrd6eta4T theorlsgi. $r ray of con-
pa,rison, it  nay be recalled that tbe chort-tera stabllity of the nonsy
4enand. funotion, on rhioh tho nonetarlst  approacbcB are baeedl ia relati-
vel.y greater than that of the lnvestment f'anotion.
lfevertheloss, €von if  stable invcstnent anct gavlng firnctions oan be foundt
the rbudgetarg theoriesn oould still  be orltlolced on the grounda tbat
a aqnber of the faotors e:rplalning inveatncnt  and saving behaviour nay
verlr rell  themselvec clepend on budgetary polioy. l{o dorbtr this ls parti-
ouLarly true ln tbc oage of the interest rato.
The budgeta4p tbcoriee probably sta^rt fron tha aseunption thetr at
thc outset, the private geotor and the oomcrolal  ba.nks arc in st39k squi-
llbrlgn and that these ecotorg d.o not, thereforel rieh to aoounu'late addi-
...fr..
(f) for cnpirioal vcrifioation of thll  potntr 3co thc duqv by Ball'cf aI.-54'
tiona,l olains or nonoy. CoaseErently, it  is obvlous that a publle defioit
oan bo finanocd on\r frora exteraal sourcas cithor because the crternaL
ceotor buys the national ,oortoBoy or foreiga exahange or becauec it  btlys
publlo sesurlticg. 3ut lf  the erteruel seotor ier to bqy eerourltiee  wlthout
the natloal lntcrest rato rielag and thus rltbout affectlng the level of
natlonal lnvestnent, ono of the foll-owing aseunpttone uuet; be sstlefied :
f)  Thc orternal eeotor , a not ln stook eqrlllbr'lum  and iar .hereforet
nilltng to aocunulata geoutitiea. Horeverr o,noe Btock egullibriun ie
attalned.r the oountnr will not be abIE to Eell. gscuritics rithout ths
interegt rate rlslng. National lnvestnent r11I fall  and part of thc
publio defloit rltl  be finanocd by aational saving. Ths trade balanoe
wlll not then be equal to the budget posLtio'n'
fl)  lhc erternal Eector le lnflnitely larger then tbc countrv in queation :
in thie eese, thc lntercot retc 1r detcrnlnod,  b;r the erteraal seotor encl
an arbitrage nechanisn ensuree that thc lnterest rate in the oountry
oannot be higber than the rorld interest ratel rlrere $roha"nge rates are
fired. Neverthelese, 'thie essurnption ls queerttonabler for tro rcaoona i
- enplriaallJr lt  cloeg not correspond to tho sltuation of tbe E\uopean
Comnnity either beoause the European  Comrunity ie an aroa rhioh le
not inflnitely smaller tban the rest of tb,e rorl,d or beoause the size
of ths oorurtries of the EuroBeen Comunlty'r partloularly the larger
oountries, ls  not lnslgnlfioant oonpared rlth tbe Duropean Comunlty
ag a yhole. A4y inoreaee ln tbe budgetary d.efictt of a oountry in tbe
E\uopean Coronwrity, for eranpJ.er Eay cauae'ibhe intersct rate to rice
ln eI1 the oorrntrlcs of the Cormunltyr lndloatlng that this deflolt
le finanoed W all thess oountriee (ff  ft  ia aaguned, thet the Etropean
Connunlty lg lsolated from the rest of tbe rorld by e qretcn of fle-
rible exohange rates). ,llorever, lt  is elgo, 'to be noted. tbat latcrost
rate ohanges &rs preciaely the ncohanlm rhsreby the budget defiolts
ln the d.ifferent oountriee are readercd oo,npatiblcr  thue d,iupcnelng
rith the need to nooordi.netetr bud.getErry pc'Iioiea. At nostr lt  oan bc
geid that the intcrest rato i.n thc Er'rropcarn Comunity depcndel anonget
other variableg, on the aggregate of, the truttgetarlr poeltions of thc
aarfr..-55-
oountries in tbe Conmunity. lfhe htgher the figure, the gleater the share
of sevin6 uscd to finanoe publio actlvity. fhe eountries of the &\rropean
Comrunity nay havt rgason to eeek, thereforer I  ot E\rropean Conruunlty
bufuet defloittr which nay be of sone glze . Eorever, the objective le one
of faotor allooatlon and not of a policy alned at etabilization.
If  tbe aseunption that the d.lnenglon of tbE European Conounity is infi-
nitc\y emaller thar tbe erternal geotor ie felt  to be juetifiable, it  ie
gt1L1 going toofar to argu.e that a oountry oan inclefinitely flnanos ite
bud.get defioit by selltng seourities to the erternel. seotor I the inerease
in the oountryrs indebtedneEs lnor€agee the finanoing riek for erternal
investors - in other rords, ell  sesurlties are not perfeot\r lnterahangcable
since the fina.uolal standing rdrioh the vatrioug borroyers ma6r enjoy cannot
be the eane in ea,oh oa,se. llhere lsr thereforel  bound. to oone a tine rhen
the govetnment oarr no longer flnance its  d.eficlt wtthout ralsing the in-"
terest rate, thereby affeoting nattonal investment a,nd. nationeL eaving and"
henoe the trade baLanoe.
- Lastlyr if, erchqgse rateg gre not f,ired.; it  is olear that lnterest ratea
nay differ between sountrice. Bhere ls then oonsiderable likelihood. that
the public defioit riLL af,feot not oaly the tradE balance but also intern-
eI investment and s4ving.
To sum up1 tbe rbudgetary thEoricsE have the following inplloation :
the smaller a oountr5r is conpared rith the regt of the world. and the more
mobile seourittes are at iaternationaL level, the less effeot the iesue
of add.l{onal seourltles bg the governnent rdlL have on the national (and
intcmatlonal) lnterest rate. In e emall oountry, thc bulk of ner seourity
leguss ylLl be aoquirecl by the erternal Bectolr and the rcal domestia effeot
of budgeta.rry policy wiLl be ineignlfioalt. It  is clea,rr honever, that these
ooaoluglons  are not direotly d.orived. fron tbe baeio equations in the trbud-
geta4p theoriestr or fron tbe above ta,ble (p.4? ) tut from speeifio economio
fupothesee.-56- AtrIEX C
I]rDICATORS OF IBADE AIID FItrAtrCIAT III,IUNATIOT*)
1.
the process of integration ln oonnotllty narkcts ln Europe is rela-
tively well surveyect ln the exlstlng literature, though becauee of tine
LagB ln publloation it  ig not easy to finil resoltg whiob inolud.e the nost
recent year.s. A najor sourc€ ls Ealassal ed.. (fgff) which contaias ln
Part I a strrd.y of trade oreation and. d,iverelon ard. of tend.encles ln intra-
Enropean speolallzatlon ln trade anil proiluotion up to a,rouncl L|TO. theeE
reglrlts supply a nunber of intllcatore of the effeotg of integration in
the forn of cha.ngps in prloe and. lncone elastloitics of lnport tlenanil
botween a prc-E0 base perlod anil a Epan of receat Jrea,rs. llho evltlenee is
not unaninoust for eta'qlle, lnoone clastlolties suggest a consicterable
increase ln interdepend,ence  (traac creation), while prlce elaetiaities
calculated for bllatereL lntra,-El iqrort tlonanil appear to bave tlininished.
in the dleoade startlng 1958 (I).  Ia le not clcar rhethcr these apec&f,io
etqd.les with an euphaals on the rorkl,ng of the prioe ncchanieq and. oonsl-
clerabla illeaggregetlon are bElng uyltateil by their authors or by others. fu
enJr caBe they nay be too oonpllcateat  anil itenaldling ln terns of date for
OPtIOA to take uP.
lilhat may be suffioient for the purpose and, nore pealietlc in terns of
the effort reqnired noulcl be to surv6y, on the ba6iE of a nore aggregatccl
nod.e1 such ae the OECD/II{F worlct trade noitel or tbe ertcrnal linlcage re-
lations in Project LIIK'the sallent charaoterlstlcs of E\uopean Conmuaity
nenbcr econoniegr inport volune denantl anil export prioe eguatlons. B;r
neanB of eEr.ations suoh as thoEe presented, in Sa,queleon (f9?3) ft  fs poeslble
to erraLlate the op€nness of eoononfes by $-ltne scnsltlvity of inporte to
eSifts in donestio clenancl ana (_ffl_thc dtegree of oontro]. of i:dividual ex-
porting countriee over theLr export prlocs. In the oase of the latter ori-
terlon there appearB to be a cl.ea,r ranlctng of oorrntrlce by size; the Larger
the cormtry, the grcater the lnpaot of tlonegtlo oost tlevelopnents  on itg
e:port prloes. lltris thrors llgbt oa the applioability of tbe Soa'ncl'lnsvian-
.. rf .,.
-'
EE.;Ta-taEsa (r9t5)' ch. 3 and pp. 50-55' *) Refor€noes to the authors Ecntloned[ nay be found, at the cnd of the annax.-51 -
Italian mod.el of lnflatl.on aooording to rhioh rrorld market price trende
together rith produotivi.ty 1lrandg ln tbe she.Lt,sred. sector d.etermine na-
tionaL inflation retes rmder fixeal erchange :rebes; the world trade mod.el
suggests lmportant nodlliloal;lons to thie view €ven for small soonomieg.
the Connlsgion has in the past conniselorred s€veral. projects
cles{gned to guantif} the nechanlenrn of lntr;r-trC incone f}tt-trrationsl
the nost reoent 8r:€ tl:r. COMf,T and. HlR0-noti'.,sr dhich focru i foreign
trade mrltlplters nors than on the prlce n**hanlsn. Some the sinulB-
tione reportetl. by Barte:n and d.f Alcantara (lglq) woul-d. conr tute uee-
flL survey naterial in an assessnent of the op,ennsso of nei uuer economieg.
2.@
Several. poteatial lndioators of financlal openness of iztctivid.ual
econonies are available anrl have beea used in empirical work. They ln-
oJ.udep ln particular, t,he ertent to whtch elone'stio interest rates have
oouforned to oonparabLe ratee elsewherot orr a,s a nore refiued. varlantt
the ertent to wbich a forward. exchange premiunr or digcount has tencted. to
elinlnate the uncoverect dtifferential between srt:nategio short-tern rates
at bone a.nd. abroad, see notably Argr ancL Eoil.Jera (fgZf). Other potentlal
ird.loators foous on the elastloity of the clenand. ftnctlons for varloue
categorlee of flnanoiaL assete rlth respeot to ohangeg in relatlve in-
tereet ratesl these indioators shoulttr la prfucLpler yiel.cl a ranlcing of
oountrLcs by ctegree of openness comespor,riling to that obtatned with the
firEt aet, sinoe both aBBeBs the clegree of sut,stltution between d.onestlc
end, f,oreign finanoial aeeets. &a,nplcs of thlor approaoh nay be fonnd t.a.
ln the work of ba.nEon Erd..E111 (fgff) on oapital flows, L.e. excess
ilena,nd. or supply of doneetlo gecuritlesl or of' Eanburger (fgZ+) on the
rlenandl for none.y fianctlon ln geleoted econonle's"
l[]ra nost pronieing oonceptuaL fremework f'or tleveLoplng lnd.laators
of flnanotal tntegration seens to be that set up W Kourl anct Porter ln
a serles of etud.les (f97a, L974t 19?5).'lheir baslo posltion ls thBt
short-tern oapltal flowe DSy bo vicwed eg arie,irlg fron lnbalanoes betrEea
the ilonegtl.o ilenand for noneta,ry baae andl the rrupplyavallablcthroughdoncstic58-
non€tary actions by the atrtborltles  and. thro"S a nrplus on cument
erternal aocount. ln ind.lcator of opannees (or fiaaaoial integration)
is proviclecL  by the clegree to which ohanges ln these supply faotore ate
offset througb oapital ln - or 6utf1ows. llhe lnepiration fron the trone-
tarSr approach to tho balanoe of pa;ments le oLea,rr in open eoononies
attenpts to stimrlate d.onegtlc aotivtty by pusbing noney supply aherid
of tlenancl leak out as capital outflows. The neohanisn nay involve sone
changes in relatlve lnterest rates or it  nay be a nor€ d.irect spill-over,
as Kouri.-ancL Porter st:ggest (f).  .t sinilar app:.*ach 0"" 6si:il adopted. by
HelliweLl anil. Leeter 119?5) for Canada.
Oa the whole theae enpirloal stucliee appear to have yialdecl plausible
and. fairLy robust results both in absolute and. relative terms. Gernan;r
cones out ag the nogt finanoially lntegrated.  econory with a d.irect offeet
of up to 8O per cent wi.thin short perlocl.s of tine. fhe offeet for the
three other cor:ntries investigated.  by Kouri ard. Porter - Auetralia, Italy
ancl the lVether1a^ndls :  ie sonewhat lower, tlpically about half that fowrd
for Oerura.ny.  The periocl of estination 1g throughout fron tbe early 1l60rs
fo L97{l--7I, i.e. the periocl of flxed. exchange rates.
Recent work by d.e Gralwa (tglS) hae ertenated a einpllfietl vereion of
the Kouri-Porte:r  nodeL to a group of Eluropean countrles. llhe nain weakncgs
of the nod.el is lts failure to illustrate the laterdepentlence of natlonal
rnonetary aotions in a group _of finanolally lntegrated.  eoononiee  ruch as
tbose of the &\uopean Conmunitlesg the rest of tbe world behaves paeslvely
by absorbing or supplying.flnanolal  aseets in a oonpletely elastic way.
firis ie lnappropriate in the analyels of E\ropean rnonetary lntegration
relevant fron the vlervpoint of OFfICA, Ilere the foous rnuet be on the inter-
d.epend.ence between the conponeat parts of the Coonunltiee  (and other coun-
trles closely linkecl. to the E\ropean Conuunities)  wlth a vlew to cleliuriting
the area within which the pursua.noe of nattonaLly set nonetarly targetg nay
enclanger the etabillty of the area ag a whole.
De Grauwefs  work takes an lnportant step in this d.irectlon by fornu-
tatlng a nod.el llnklng the nonetary basfu of seven lhrropean countriee:
Bclgl.un, Franoe , Oernany, ItaLyt l$ethcr1a^ud.sr Switzerland  and. the Unlted
Klngd,om. In a f,lxsd cxohange ratc rogtnc ohang€s in the lnternatlonel re-
scrvcs of onc oountry dlepcnd. on thc il,oncgtlo troncy orcati.on ln the corutry
liffiCi-ena Portcr put tho oala cnpha;lo on ,thb dllrcot nrbgtltutlon bctwccn
d.oneetto andl f,orslgn souroos of Eonotary barcr but tbcy also find, rlgni-
floant effcotg of ohangcg ln lntcreat ratc dl.lfforsntlaLg. Slnoc auoh changca
arc lyatenatloally rolatetl to d,oncstto nonctary aotlonsl the frrll off,gct
to cuoh aotLong ls larger than tbe dlreotly agtinated. offget oocfflolento
ruggcet.-59-
Itself, !n the other eix and. (ilfeally) ln tho outelde world.. ilo na-
tlonal iaterest rates or l,noomes arc e:cpl.l.oitly includetl i.n the nod.el.
llhe d.enantt for noney ts lurplicitly regalded &e stable I eo that all
nonetary tl.igturbanees arlere on the supply sldle. thle ei.nple notlel la
then estinated on guarterly  ohanges ln 1!!$ through 19?0 ln the (ad-
justed) moneta,rXr bege. Eourever, due to nultlctollinearlty betwesr donestLrl
noney oreatlon ln the seven econonlesronl.y the inpaot fron the present
and the prevlous quarterrsr d.onestlc lloncy or€tatLon in the particular
econongr ig estlnaterlg the lnpact fron d.oneeti.o neasuree Ln any of the
other slx econonles ls asglrned to ooagtitute a proportlon of tbat other
copntryrs reserve cha,nge c,orresponding to tbel ahare ln the eeven-country
GI{P of the econory stuilieil,. Ae dle Grauwe hlnerelf points outr thla is a
'orradelassunption which red,uoes the rellablltty of tbe results; f,or era,rop.Lat
the share of Switzerlancl in total 6[I{P no doutrt und.erstates lts flnancial
role ln shaptng ftaLian or Gernan capltal florg.
Desplte these shortoonlage  thc approaoh of tle Orauwe with ite en-
phasie on intra-E\rropean interd.epenclenoe  and the dlependenoe of the area
upon what happene in tba United States and. tlte hrno-currancy narkets geeme
the nost pronising polnt of cteparture for c4rlrlioal worh during a poseib.Le
eecond. phase in the work of OFfICA. lltre preJ.i,nina,ry results tor L959-7O
aooor{, broadly rlth gJglgII notlong about t}rc ranklng of Europcan coono-.
nlea by cl.egree of openneesg in thc gnallor coononles the offset to tloncetlc
nonetargr bagc creation througb r€aerve fLows ls nearly 10O pcr oent afte:r
two quarters, even hlgher. in Erltzerl.and. ther firranclal" openness of
Oernany ie found. to be a bit Lees pronounoed. than in the resnlts of Kour:i.
and Porter.
lllhe regultg oa offect are only onc part of, ile 0raurere analysis: he
proceeds from then to a stnd.y of how varlocs slnple proceduree on eterLlji.-
zation of reserve flows in the seven econonlc,s nay lead. to erplosive  swinge
in reserves. Syetenatic uge of full  or near-fbtl sterlllzatlon by two or
nore countries d.oeg, i:nd.eei[, lead, to ellch srlngsr thereby forcing
elther an aband.onnent of storllizatlon or struotural changegl 3.g. ln the
forn of aontrole on capltal f,lowa. 1[he aaalycris ls rich ln lnplloatione
for tbe deelgn of nonetary polloy ln a systcrr of fl:cd crchange ratee iJr
that tt  poiats to linitg - ln thc forn of, na*lmrn pcruisglble gtcrilizati.on -
to natlonal nonetary lnd,cperdenoe lnBlde a fl,nanolally lntegratcil' arsa. As
. .,/ ..,-50-
srcb it  re of great intereet in the evaluatioa of the feaeiblrlty
of European nonetar;r unlfioatlon in thc linited, eense of narror ba.nd.s
around' crosa paritles between partroipating cu*6noiee.
The aln of angr emplrlcal work und.ertaken by opfrcA in this srea
shoulit be, by the sinpleet aethod,s available, (r) to reflne a.nd. to
upd'ate throngh 19?5 these results for the seven oountrles et'd.ieil by
de Grauwer (e) to ertend. them to other countrJ.ee rorevant fron the
viewpoint of Er'opean conmunltieer nonetarSr co-operation and (r) to
draw inpllcations for the d.esign of aatr.onal nonetary porloy f,or co'n_ tries lnsid.e a.nd. outsrd.e the snake. $uoh an ana'yels rould. be a ueefur
contribution to the ongoing attenpte by the Conniselon nnd. national
officials to assess natioaar nonetgry a,ctiong. The approach ie werl_
Jbund'eil theoreticarly  and topicarl rt nay be reoallecr, tn particurarl
that the largest nenber econoqy, Gernarqr, ig cu*ently pnnsuing a mone_
tary policy oonceived' in tenns of a target grow'th rate for central bank
noney (nonetary base).
the to devel for assesa iaa
of alteraatlve tar-6L-
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